









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 



































Are There Economic Returns from Democracy?  
The Experience of Sub-Saharan Africa from 1988-2007 
 
RYAN ANDERSEN  
(ANDRYA003) 
A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree of  
Master of Arts in Political Science 
 
Faculty of the Humanities 




COMPULSORY DECLARATION  
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for the award of any degree.  
It is my own work.  Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this dissertation from the  

















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ....................................................................................... 3 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 6 
I. PROBLEM ......................................................................................................................................... 6 
II. SIGNIFICANCE ............................................................................................................................... 8 
III. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ........................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN .......................................................................... 20 
I. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................................20 
II. HYPOTHESIS ................................................................................................................................20 
III. KEY CONCEPTS ..........................................................................................................................22 
IV. A SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND INDICATORS .............................................................31 
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................32 
VI.   EXPECTATIONS .......................................................................................................................36 
CHAPTER THREE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ........................................................ 38 
I. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY ..............................................................................................................38 
II. ECONOMIC GROWTH ................................................................................................................45 
III. CONTROL VARIABLES .............................................................................................................52 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS .................................................................... 62 
I. CORRELATION ANALYSIS .........................................................................................................68 
II. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ..........................................................................................................73 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 83 
APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................... 86 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 87 
















LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Average Freedom House Score for SSA 1972-2007 ....................... 39 
Figure 3.2:  Average Freedom House Score for SSA 1988-1995 ...................... 40 
Figure 3.3:  Level of Democracy for SSA 1988 vs. 1995 ...................................... 41 
Table  3.1:  Level of Democracy for SSA at 1995 ................................................... 42 
Figure 3.4:  Change in Freedom House Score 1988-1995 .................................. 43 
Table 3.2:  Change in Level of Democracy 1988-1995 ........................................ 44 
Figure 3.5:  First Free and Fair or First Competitive National Elections Held 
in SSA 1988-1995 ............................................................................................................. 45 
Figure 3.6:  GDP Growth (1961-2007) and Freedom House Score (1972-
2007) .................................................................................................................................... 46 
Figure 3.7:  Average Annual Growth of GDP in SSA 1961-2007 ....................... 46 
Table 3.3: GDP Growth Simple Average versus Population Weighted 
Average ................................................................................................................................ 48 
Figure 3.8: Average Annual GDP Growth for SSA (1998-2007) ....................... 49 
Figure 3.9: Average Annual GDP Growth for SSA ................................................. 50 
Table 3.4: Average Annual GDP Growth in SSA 1996-2001 .............................. 50 
Figure 3.10: GDP Growth in SSA Pre/Post-Election ............................................. 51 
Table 3.5: Average Annual GDP Growth – Six Periods Pre/Post-Election ... 52 
Table 3.6: Good Governance Measures 1996 ......................................................... 53 
Figure 3.11: World Bank Governance Measures 1996 ....................................... 53 
Table 3.7: Compliance with World Bank SAPs 1997 ........................................... 54 
Table 3.8: Level of Resource Wealth in SSA 1995 ................................................ 55 
Figure 3.12: SSA Resource-Rich Economies at 1995 ........................................... 56 
Figure 3.13: SSA Countries in Poverty Traps ......................................................... 57 
Figure 3.14: SSA Countries in Poverty Traps ......................................................... 58 
Figure 3.15: GNI per capita, PPP (current int’l $) for SSA in 1995 .................. 60 
Table 3.9: GNI per capita PPP for SSA Countries in 1995 .................................. 60 
Figure 4.1: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 with 















Figure 4.2: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 without 
Outliers ................................................................................................................................ 65 
Figure 4.3: Scatterplot Change in Democracy vs. Growth 6-year Period with 
Outliers ................................................................................................................................ 66 
Figure 4.4: Scatterplot Change in Democracy vs. Growth 6-year Period 
without Outliers ............................................................................................................... 67 
Table 4.1: Correlations Between Growth, Democracy (at 1995) and Control 
Variables ............................................................................................................................. 68 
Figure 4.5: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 without 
Outliers ................................................................................................................................ 70 
Figure 4.6: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-2001 without 
Outliers ................................................................................................................................ 71 
Table 4.2: Correlations Between Growth, Change in Democracy (First 
Election) and Control Variables ................................................................................. 72 
Table 4.4: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-
1998 with Control Variables ........................................................................................ 74 
Table 4.5: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-
1998 with Control Variables Part I ............................................................................ 76 
Table 4.6: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-
1998 with Control Variables Part II .......................................................................... 77 
Table 4.7: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-
2001 with Control Variables ........................................................................................ 78 
Table 4.8: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-
2001 with Control Variables Part I ............................................................................ 80 
Table 4.9: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-


















There is an enduring debate as to whether democracy promotes or hinders economic 
growth. This study examines the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth in 47 sub-Saharan African countries from 1988 to 2007. From the late 1980s 
until the mid-1990s, a period of democratization swept the continent.  This period of 
democratization was followed by a period of strong economic growth from the mid-
1990s through 2007. It is argued here that these events are not coincidental and that 
democracy is advantageous to economic growth, particularly in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region.  Using statistical analyses such as bivariate correlation and multiple 
regression, the relationship between democracy and economic growth is examined 
using a number of control variables to test the strength of the relationship between 
democracy and growth. To date, the empirical research on democracy and economic 
growth provides conflicting results, ranging from positive to negative to neutral 
effects. The results of this study show that there is a correlation between higher levels 
of democracy and higher levels of economic growth during certain periods. However, 
this relationship weakens to levels that are not significant once certain combinations 
of control variables are included.  While the results of the study do not provide a 
definitive answer to the debate, they do refute certain arguments that have been made 
about the main drivers of economic growth in the region. The results also show that 
democracy does not ha e a negative effect on growth, which highly suggests that 
there might be a sequence effect involved in the path towards democratization and 





















Between 1996 and 2007, sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies achieved an average 
annual increase in economic growth of 2.42%.
1
 This was one of the longest periods of 
sustained economic growth for the region since independence when, from 1965 to 
1976, average annual economic growth was 2.26%.
2
 In contrast, during the preceding 
years from 1977 to 1995, average annual economic growth was -0.26%.
3
 While 
economic growth was positive for some countries from 1977 to 1995, the economies 
of many other countries contracted, leaving them much worse off from whence they 
started. Scholars point to unrelenting civil strife, war, corruption, volatile commodity 
prices and plundering of resources as factors contributing to SSA’s negative economic 
growth during this time. 
The recent period of positive economic growth (1996-2007) followed a wave of 
democratization in the early 1990s commonly referred to as SSA’s second 
independence.
4
 These democratic transitions were initiated largely by African civil 
society movements, seeking greater economic and political freedoms following years 
of economic and political mismanagement.
5
 As a coda to the larger third wave of 
democratization that swept the world beginning in 1970s Portugal,
6
 and extended 
through the end of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a decisive shift 
towards competitive elections and multi-party politics with 35 of its 47 states holding 
a competitive founding election by 1995.
7
 Although only 18 of these founding 
elections were deemed reasonably free and fair, and there have been subsequent 
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reversals, by 1995 not a single de jure one-party state remained in the region.
8
 By the 
end of January 2007, 30 states in the region could boast governments elected through 
free and fair democratic elections.
9
 This period of democratic transition was clearly a 
watershed for the region. 
Yet some scholars suggest that the temporal sequence of democratization followed by 
growth is coincidental.  Many would point to the fact that the period of economic 
growth also followed a related, but distinct, set of economic transitions because of 
pressure from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (e.g., the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)). The IFIs encouraged many countries in SSA to 
implement good governance policies as part of a package of economic, political and 
social reforms mandated in structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Over 30 African 
countries eventually adopted SAPs, to varying degrees, during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Still other scholars would suggest that this period of economic growth reflects intense 
economic expansion in a small number of resource-rich countries.   
In contrast to these arguments, one scholar has made it his life’s work to point out that 
the problems in Africa’s most destitute and troubled countries are not specifically 
related to economic growth or democratization but to poverty traps.  Poverty traps 
involve geopolitical issues such as internal and external conflict, disadvantageous 
geography, mismanagement of natural resources, volatile neighbors and being small 
countries with poorly run governments.  
With many possible explanations, this makes the period from the late 1980s through 
the late 2000s in SSA particularly interesting for political scientists investigating the 
relationship between democracy and growth. Was SSA’s economic growth a result of 
the democratization of these states or was it an independent, isolated event? Was the 
economic growth only attributable to a few select resource-rich economies in SSA or 
were there other factors that benefitted states such as adopting good governance 
measures or avoiding poverty traps? 
The reasons I believe democratic countries are poised to attain higher, more consistent 
levels of economic growth, particularly over the long-term, are three-fold.  First, 
democratic institutions can create an environment built on transparency, stability and 
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enforceability.  Second, the civil liberties and political rights prevalent in strong 
democracies promote the free exchange of words, ideas and actions. Finally, there is a 
synergy among the people, government and industry of a democracy that engenders 
innovation, motivation and realization.  I believe that the combination of these factors, 
which I will discuss in greater detail in subsequent chapters, provides an ideal 
environment for economic growth.  Against this backdrop, my main research question 
will focus on the effect of democracy on economic growth in SSA during the period 
from 1988 to 2007.  My hypothesis will build on and test theories contained in recent 
literature that extol democracy as a political regime that facilitates, and is a precursor 
to, economic growth and not one that inhibits it.  To do this, I will first use Freedom 
House measures of civil liberties and political rights as a proxy for the level of 
democracy from 1988 to 1995 for 47 SSA countries.  To assess economic growth, I 
will use the growth rate of gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita) during 
the subsequent period (1996-2007). To control for other possible explanations, I will 
include variables that measure factors highlighted by other theories advanced by 
scholars who do not believe that democracy or democracy alone can affect economic 
growth. These main control variables include implementation of good governance 
reforms and economic reforms, resource-rich economies, and the presence of poverty 
traps. I will also control for initial levels of wealth and whether or not a country is an 
oil importing or exporting country. 
II. SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Despite the abundance of research on the topic of democracy and growth, findings are 
still contradictory in this area of study: there is no definitive evidence or obvious 
theory capable of describing the nature of the relationship. While there is a fairly 
broad literature that analyzes the impact of political regime type on economic growth 
and economic development (and vice versa), there is a relatively limited focus on sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in connection with the wave of democratic transitions in 
the 1990s and the ensuing economic growth.  This makes the regional focus of this 
study particularly important because, despite recent movement towards democracy, 
SSA is still mainly composed of impoverished, authoritarian states with only a 















It is clear that there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to political and economic 
development in the world and a recent study, which highlights this fact, found that 
democratization had distinctly different economic effects in several different regions 
in the world. The prevalence of cross-continental studies, which might include over 
100 countries, may mask region-specific dynamics that ultimately affect economic 
trends. My study will build on this previous work looking at democracy, specifically 
in the SSA region. 
Another significant factor that this study will capture is the contemporary period. 
Most studies range from the post-independence years and end around 1990. This 
study will capture a period of democratization and sustained economic growth not 
seen since independence.  In addition, older studies include the Cold War years when 
many authoritarian regimes were tolerated and supported (both economically and 
politically) by the United States and the Soviet Union. These events likely hindered 
the development of both democracy and economic growth.  Adam Przeworski notes 
that, “Remarkably, no statistical study published before 1982 found that democracies 




Finding a correlation or putative link between democracy and economic growth 
would provide an important validation to current literature that cites democracy, 
particularly in developing countries, as one of the most important factors contributing 
to increased economic growth rather than the impediment proclaimed by earlier 
theories of development.  Finding a positive relationship would also add greater 
significance to efforts already underway to strengthen SSA’s governance and 
institutional framework by a number of stakeholders in the field such as bilateral 
donors, IFIs, academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to name a few.  
III. STATE OF KNOWLEDGE  
 
For years, the relationship and direction of causality between democracy and 
economic growth has been contested: does democracy lead to economic growth or 
inhibit it?  The literature on the subject can be consolidated into three broad 
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questions: 1) Does modernization lead to democratization? 2) Does democracy only 
consolidate in wealthy countries? and 3) Does democracy affect economic growth? 
While there is no definitive answer yet to the main question posed above in the 
opening sentence, there is a large body of literature and data from which to build and 
test my research question. 
 
Overview 
From the mid 20
th
 century, modernization theory held center stage in the debate on 
democracy and economic growth. Its proponents contended that a certain level of 
economic development, attained through strong rule and order (authoritative regimes 
if necessary), was a prerequisite for a country to transition to a sustainable democracy.  
Some scholars found that the increased consumption and particularistic pressures of 
the masses inherent in a democracy act as a drag on economic growth by displacing 
the very resources necessary for political organizations and institutions to grow and 
develop in order to better handle the increased demands.
11
 Others believed that secure 
property rights, an important condition to attract investment and stimulate growth, 
would be undermined by demands for redistribution of wealth from newly engaged 
citizens in a democratic society.  
On the other end of the spectrum, recent literature has found democracy advantageous 
to economic growth and socio-economic progress, with democratic regimes reaping 
the benefits that more representative and pluralistic political systems engender.
12
 The 
importance of democratization as a means to increase economic growth gained 
prominence in the foreign policy of the West in the late 1990s.  This change in focus 
challenged the widely held belief among policymakers (particularly during the Cold 
War in the United States) that authoritarian regimes were the key to economic growth 
and social development, with economic growth and development eventually leading 
the way to the political, social and economic freedoms that define most stable 
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 For the first time, many scholars are now seriously looking at 
democracy as an independent rather than a dependent variable when examining its 
relationship with economic growth.
14
 
Still other scholars find democracy’s effect on economic growth to be insignificant, 
citing a host of other, potentially more important factors such as good governance, 
economic liberalization, natural resources and the avoidance of poverty traps.  
Scholars who have focused on regional contexts have discovered that democracy may 
negatively affect economic growth in Asian and Latin American countries, but that 
sub-Saharan African countries, in particular, seem to benefit from democratization 
movements because they are able to displace predatory regimes.
15
 I will take into 
account several of these other competing explanations as I work through my analysis. 
Does Modernization Lead to Democratization? 
In the late 1950s, Seymour Martin Lipset produced a seminal study that established a 
broad correlation between countries with high levels of industrialization, urbanization, 
education and wealth (mostly in the Americas, Europe, and places where democracy 
thrived).
16
 Lipset and his colleagues called the process, whereby democracy emerges 
after a steady increase in economic and social indicators, modernization.
17
 Yet while 
Lipset’s empirical study revealed that almost all democracies were economically 
developed, it provided little insight into when, why and (most importantly) how the 
transition occurs.  In addition, the study did not explore how democracy might affect 
economic growth or how modernization theory might explain the exogenous 
appearance and consolidation of democracy in a country such as India, which was not 
“modern” in many ways when it democratized in 1947 (India’s GNP per capita level 
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Samuel Huntington challenged one of the tenets of modernization theory by 
demonstrating that states focused on improving economic and social conditions must 
simultaneously increase political institutionalization and organization or risk political 
disorder and instability.
19
 Huntington argued that increased particularistic demands 
during political modernization lead to policies that contribute to higher personal 
consumption instead of investment in the infrastructure and institutions necessary to 
sustain future economic and political growth (see Huntington and Dominguez 1975, 
Huntington 1965).
20
 For Huntington and his colleagues, limiting democracy, at least 
temporarily, was necessary to promote policies and institutions that encourage 
economic growth (see Huntington & Nelson 1976, de Schweinitz, Jr. 1959).
21
 
While Lipset and Huntington contributed much to the idea of modernization, it was 
not theirs alone. Walt Rostow focused on the economic side of the debate and argued 
(through his five-stage “take-off” economic development process) that economic 
modernization is democracy.
22
 More recently, Ronald Inglehart’s work has focused 
on cultural change and its effects within modernization theory. Inglehart, along with 
Christian Welzel, argued that a human development sequence (or broadening of 
choice and self-expression values) represented by “socioeconomic modernization, 
rising liberty aspirations, and the quest for democratic institutions” results in 
institutionalized democracy (for other examples of the modernization debate see 
Bollen & Jackman 1989).
23
 
Does Democracy Only Consolidate in Wealthy Countries? 
Adam Przeworski and his colleagues challenged and clarified previous theories of the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth.  Through an empirical 
analysis of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990, Przeworski found that virtually any 
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country could democratize regardless of its level of wealth, but that richer countries 
had a better chance of sustaining those democracies: “no democracy ever fell in a 
country with a per capita income higher than that of Argentina in 1975—US$6055”.
24
 
This both affirms and rebuts Lipset’s modernization theory: democracy is more 
prevalent in rich countries and although it is not more likely to emerge when a 
country becomes modernized, it is more likely to consolidate and endure.
25
 In contrast 
to Lipset’s assertion that rapid growth destabilizes democracy, Przeworski and 
Limongi found that rapid growth is actually good for democracies as well as 
dictatorships while economic decline causes democracies to fail.
26
  
Does Democracy Affect Economic Growth? 
More recently, the causal arrow in the debate has begun to be reversed with findings 
from scholars investigating the impact of democracy on economic growth running the 
gamut, from some correlation to little or no (and even a negative) correlation.
27
  
Huntington argued that increased demands from newly engaged citizens in a 
democracy were an impediment to economic growth because it destabilizes 
countries.
28
 Likewise, Walter Galenson claimed in 1959 that “the more democratic a 




In the 1990s, Przeworski’s work falsified the earlier arguments made by Lipset, 
Huntington, and Galenson, boldly concluding that, “the views that dictatorships 
promote development and that development breeds democracy are both false. There is 
now a broad consensus that political regimes, dichotomized as dictatorships and 
democracies, do not differ on the average in their annual rates of growth of total 
income.”
30
 Przeworski also dispelled both Huntington’s and Galenson’s claims that 
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democracies invest less and suffer increased consumption, finding no support for this 
argument in the empirical evidence.
31
 Przeworski instead cites a confluence of factors 
that influence economic growth, not the least of which is political institutions that 
“promote economic growth, internal peace, and general welfare.”
32
 The different 
economic and social conditions under which regimes operate over time also have a 
big impact on the relationship between the political regime and economic growth.  
While authoritarian governments can produce miracles such as the Asian Tiger 
economies of Singapore and Malaysia, they can also just as easily go into a downward 
spiral like Zimbabwe.  For many, life under an authoritarian regime is short and grim 
and for that reason, Przeworski argues, “democracy does make a difference, not only 
for political liberty but also for material well-being.”
33
 
A subsequent study by Tavares & Wacziarg (2000) found that the indirect links (e.g., 
trade openness, government consumption, political instability, human capital, and 
investment rate, among others) between democracy and economic growth examined 
in the literature are much better grounded theoretically than the direct links.
34
 While 
their main results showed that the impact of democracy on economic growth is 
negative but moderate, they were able to determine that this result was driven by an 
increase in human capital expenditures and a decrease in physical investment, thus 
reaffirming both Huntington and Galenson’s argument.
35
 This runs counter to 
Przeworski’s claim that the high capital accumulation and low physical investment 
argument made by Huntington and others has not been proven in the literature, but 
perhaps Przeworski was right when he said, “investment rates are simply low in poor 
countries. Poverty is so tightly constraining that there is no room for political regimes 
to make a difference.”
36
  
The recent work of Morton Halperin et al does find that the type of political regime 
makes a difference so long as that regime is democratic. Halperin et al dispute 
Przeworski’s study of democratic backtracking based on income level (i.e., once 
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democratic countries reach certain levels of GDP it is very unlikely they will 
backtrack to authoritarian regimes).  Instead, Halperin et al cite other factors such as 
the rate of growth, inflation rates, strength of the private sector and level of 
dependence on natural resources as factors that have a greater impact on whether or 
not democracy will backtrack in prosperous and poor countries alike.
37
 Halperin et al 
also dispute modernization theorists such as Rostow, stating that policymakers should 
not wait for an economic “take-off” point to encourage democracy because even poor, 
developing countries can (and need to) democratize.
38
 
The results of Halperin et al’s study, which covers over 40 years (1960-2001), 
persuasively dispels the belief perpetuated by the modernization school of thought 
that democracies hinder growth and development, particularly in poor countries. 
Halperin et al assert that the dispersal of power is one of the main characteristics of a 
democracy that makes it work.  Democracies are also able to consider a broader range 
of issues on a more regular basis and policy decisions are more moderate and 
nuanced; characteristics that contribute to another one of democracy’s most 
distinctive qualities – steadiness.
39
 This steadiness is also seen in the economic 
growth and development in a democracy: foregoing boom and bust for moderate 
gains and small declines.
40
 The authors also found that democracies performed better 
across a wide range of development indicators (e.g., life expectancy, secondary school 
enrollment, cereal yields and childhood mortality), which they attribute to shared 
power, openness, and adaptability.
41
  
A 2006 study by Jonathan Krieckhaus examined the influence of democracy on 
economic growth within regions, comparing this relationship between regimes in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.  Krieckhaus hypothesized that democracy has a 
positive impact in sub-Saharan African countries, where patrimonialism is 
particularly strong, due to the ability to evict corrupt politicians through democratic 
processes.
42
 In contrast, Krieckhaus hypothesized that democratic demands in Asia 
would negatively affect growth by impeding the implementation of policies focused 
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on expanding growth (e.g., the industrial policies implemented in developmental 
states like Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia), while redistributionist demands of 
social groups in Latin America would hinder economic growth through populist 
politics focused on ending inequality.
43
 Krieckhaus’ point of departure for this study 
was based on the fact that many recent statistical studies had shown null findings 
regarding the influence of democracy on economic growth, but the case studies were 
saying something entirely different, namely that democracy does influence growth.  
Using cross-sectional and time series cross-sectional analyses over two, 20-year 
periods from 1960-2000, Krieckhaus confirmed his theory that economic growth is 
highly contingent upon the broader political context and that in sub-Saharan Africa 
democracy, generally, has a small, but positive effect.
44
 These findings validate the 
criticism that the statistical literature in this area of study is guilty of “excessive 
homogenization” of countries, regions and regimes.
45
 Regionally focused area-studies 
such as this one may help uncover details that could be drowned out in global studies.  
Are There Other Factors That Affect Economic Growth Not Related to Regime 
Type? 
Notwithstanding these debates, many scholars of democracy and economic growth 
focus on other factors. Paul Collier, an economist at Oxford University, recently 
argued that regime type does not really make a difference if a country is stuck in a 
poverty trap. The four traps that Collier identified (conflict, the presence of natural 
resource, being landlocked with bad neighbors and bad governance in small 
countries) are based on a confluence of factors that extend beyond just political 
regime type and encompass social, geographic, political and economic factors.
46
  
The residents of the countries that have fallen victim to these traps, a majority of 
which are in Africa, comprise what Collier calls the bottom billion.  Traditionally, 
development assistance has been viewed as one billion people in the rich world trying 
to help the five billion that are developing. Collier points out that the focus should 
change because a majority of the five billion resides in countries that are clearly on a 
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development path, some on a very quick development path indeed.
47
 The real 
problem, Collier points out, is with the bottom billion – people who live in countries 
beset by “civil war, plague, ignorance,” among other things.
48
 
Collier identified and diagnosed the traps (and its victims) almost like a syndrome 
ready for a cure, but small, landlocked, resource-scarce countries with volatile 
neighbors and poor governance will have to make a Herculean effort on many levels 
in order to surmount all of these obstacles. Due to the intractable nature of most of 
these traps, it is little wonder that the economies in these countries are stymied, the 
politicians inept or corrupt and the prospects limited.  According to Collier, these four 
traps severely impede economic growth and development in these countries (and 
those around them). 
Research Methods and Results in the Literature 
The empirical studies performed to date have shown a range of results (positive and 
negative, significant and not significant) between democracy and economic growth 
yet still offer no definitive answer quantifying the importance of the relationship. This 
is not surprising given the wide range of methodological approaches.  With the goal 
of this study to focus exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa and uncover even small 
relationships between democracy and economic growth within the sample of 47 
states, I will first discuss the methodological shortcomings of the literature compared 
to my study and then explain how I will address them. 
Many of the indicators used in the literature are dated. Lipset’s seminal work was 
based on a number of different indices (e.g., the number of motor vehicles, 
telephones, radios and newspapers present in a population) from the 1950s that he 
used to measure the relationship between the level of economic development and 
democracy for European, English-speaking and Latin American countries.
49
 The data 
are now obsolete and for this study Lipset’s theory, which states that economic 
growth and development lead to democracy, is diametrically opposed to my 
hypothesis.  
                                                        
47




















The definition of democracy has varied a great deal from study to study and over 
time. Lipset’s definition was fairly loose and based more on whether or not a 
democracy was challenged by rival political parties or held elections than the 
prevalence of rights and institutions.
50
 Przeworski dichotomized regimes into 
democracies and dictatorships, missing the nuances of using a scale that measures 
democracy (or lack thereof) across a continuum. Halperin et al measured the level of 
democracy across a continuum but used Polity IV, which is focused more on 
institutionalized democracy. 
Most of the studies cover a broad swath of time stretching from the 1960s to the 
1990s, with a few including the first few years of the new millennium. Because of 
this, the work of Prezworski, Halperin et al and many others does not include the 
most recent decade and crucially, many of the older studies miss the post-Cold War 
years, which have been transformative for many former communist countries as well 
as Communist proxy states. 
Finally, case selection in the literature varies widely and has run the gamut from all 
developing countries to all Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, from small regional groupings of countries to OECD 
plus all developing countries. This has made it difficult to use the studies for broad 
comparison or application and because there has been such little focus on sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular, there is very limited historical data that addresses my hypothesis.  
To address these shortcomings in the literature my study will use the most recent 
indicators available and I will measure democracy based on the very comprehensive 
Freedom House Freedom in the World index, which focuses on the level of civil 
liberties and political rights for over 190 countries in the world. The Freedom House 
index provides a broader definition of democracy that runs along a continuum, 
allowing scholars the ability to capture the nuances of democracy where it might not 
be as easily measured in other indices; a stark contrast to Lipset’s or Prezworski’s 
categorical classifications. The period of my study, from 1988 to 2007, will cover the 
most recent wave of democratization and the most recent period of economic growth, 
as well as the post-Cold War period – three very important events that will broaden 
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the literature. My study will also add to the very limited contemporary research of 















CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN 
I. ARGUMENT 
 
With many different points of entry into the study of democracy and economic 
growth, I will focus on the specific time and place of sub-Saharan Africa from 1988 
to 2007.  The early and middle years of this period witnessed the watershed events 
related to the region’s third wave of democratization and second independence
51
 
while the latter part of the period was evidenced by one of the region’s longest 
periods of sustained economic growth since many states became independent over 30 
years earlier.  
I believe that the co-occurrence of these two trends is not a coincidence and that there 
is a positive relationship between them. My argument rests upon the hypothesis that 
countries that are more democratic will provide the better political organization and 
institutional framework necessary to attain higher, more stable levels of economic 
growth over the long-term.  The basic rights and freedoms that comprise the 
foundation of a democracy also provide the foundation for countries to grow 
economically, politically and socially. Having the right to free speech, own property 
and elect leaders through free and fair elections provides the checks and balances, 
stability and civil liberties necessary for prosperity. Although there are many different 
factors (political, economic, social, etc.) that can influence economic growth, I 
believe that a democratic foundation (and the extent to which it is present in a 
country, particularly in SSA) is advantageous.  
I do not expect the effects of democracy on economic growth to be simultaneous.  
There is most certainly a time lag between an increase (or decrease) in the level of 
democracy in a country and the level of economic growth or contraction.  To 
determine the extent of the time lag I will test several different periods of various 




                                                        















Based on the problem identified in Chapter 1, and building on the research findings in 
the literature review, I have formulated one main hypothesis using economic and 
political data from 47 sub-Saharan countries between 1988 and 2007: 
 Countries with higher levels of democracy at 1995 or that increased their 
level of democracy between 1988 and 1995, attained higher levels of 
subsequent economic growth than countries that backtracked, stayed at the 
same levels or had a relatively lower level.   
I will test this relationship by looking at two different periods, based on: 1) the 
absolute level of democracy as measured in 1995; and 2) the change in the level of 
democracy beginning in the year of a country’s first free and fair or first competitive 
national election. 
Control Variables: After I test the main hypothesis, I will add several additional 
control variables that could potentially falsify my hypothesis.  I will perform various 
statistical analyses to see how the variables interact and to see if the results from the 
original hypothesis still hold true.  Controlling for a potential “third” variable like this 
could uncover spurious results where another explanatory variable is affecting the 
results. 
Once I determine the relationship between democratization and economic growth I 
will then test to see what happens to the relationship by adding the following control 
variables (described in more detail in the Key Concepts section that follows): 
 Countries that have good governance, as measured by the:  
o World Bank Governance Matters VIII indicators Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality. 
 Countries that liberalized their economy through structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), as measured by the: 
o World Bank review of Structural Adjustment. 
 Countries that derive a large part of their economic activity from 
resource wealth, as measured by the:  
o Work of Collier and O’Connell.  
 Countries that fall into one or more poverty traps, based on: 















 Controlling for initial wealth, as measured by the: 
o GNI per capita, PPP 1995. 
 Controlling for oil dependence, as measured by the: 
o Oil importing or exporting status of the country identified by 
the International Monetary Fund. 
III. KEY CONCEPTS  
 
Conceptualizing Democracy and Economic Growth 
The definition of democracy in the literature has varied widely, leading political 
scientist Robert Dahl to astutely state, “democracy has meant different things to 
different people at different times and places.”
52
 Przeworski, for example, takes a 
Schumpeterian, or procedural, angle in defining democracy, which he states as simply 
“a political regime in which rulers are selected through free and contested elections” 
and “in which incumbents lose elections and leave office if they do.”
53
 Halperin et al 
broaden that definition, highlighting additional characteristics inherent to democracy 
such as “popular participation, genuine competition for executive office, and 
institutional checks on power.”
54
 For the purposes of this study, I will consider 
democracy to have a broader definition, based on several elements prevalent in the 
literature: recurring, free and fair elections; personal and political rights; separation of 
power; and checks and balances on the executive office.   
While different countries may adhere to these elements of democracy to varying 
degrees over time, this study will not dichotomize countries and solely focus on 
whether they are authoritarian or democratic based on a certain cut-off level, but 
rather seek to assess the level of democracy based on a composite score that spans a 
continuum, resulting in levels of democracy.  The variables I will use (described in 
detail later) to measure the level of democracy take into account many facets of 
democracy, not simply whether elections have been held or not although elections, 
and the quality of the election, can provide a good indication of a country’s 
commitment to achieving democratic ideals. A broader definition of democracy will 
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also allow this study to consider countries that may have elements of both regimes or 
may not have fully implemented some features of democracy as completely as other 
countries.  The road to a consolidated, liberal democracy is often not a straight one or 
an identical one. 
Approaching the study in this way is important due to the limited success SSA has 
had in sustaining and consolidating democracy.  Mattes and Bratton note, “taking 
1995 as the high-water mark of the initial wave of democratizations, 12 countries 
successfully transitioned from an authoritarian state directly to a liberal or electoral 
democracy and then consistently maintained that status between 1996 and 2008.”
55
 I 
will measure the change in the level of democracy in the region during the period 
1988 to 1995 by looking at whether or not a country held either a first “free and 
fair”
56
 or first competitive national election during this time and then comparing the 
change in the Freedom House score from the year of the election to the score three 
years earlier. To measure the level of democracy in a different way, I will also use the 
level of democracy at the high-water mark in 1995 for all countries.  I will then test to 
see what the effects were on economic growth over several different lagged periods.  
The meaning of economic growth is less contested and generally measured as the 
annual change in a country’s GDP or GNP.
ii
 While the term economic growth can 
take on a broader meaning when considering economic development, which can 
include factors such as human development indicators, institutionalization and income 
distribution, I will focus solely on economic growth at the macro level.  My focus 
does not intend to diminish the importance of these other measures, but it is simply 
beyond the scope of this minor dissertation.  
Definitions and Measures  
a. Democracy 
Over time, democracy has meant different things to different people.  Some believe 
that holding an election is sufficient to merit the classification of democracy while 
others believe that elections are only the beginning and that a true measure of 
democracy must be complemented by extensive civil rights, political rights and a 
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separation of power within government. For this study, I will operationalize the level 
of democracy in SSA through the Freedom House index Freedom in the World. 
Based largely upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
iii
, the Freedom House 
index provides an evaluation of global freedom based upon the belief that:  
 
political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote freely for 
distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for 
public office, join political parties and organizations, and 
elect representatives who have a decisive impact on 
public policies and are accountable to the electorate. 
Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and 
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 





While Freedom House does not label countries as democratic or autocratic, the 1 
(free) to 7 (not free) scale – with partly free in the middle- on which they rate levels 
of civil liberties and political rights has become one of the best proxies
58
 to measure 
attributes that many consider to form the foundation of democracy. To operationalize 
this variable I will average the Civil Liberties and Political Rights scores to arrive at 
one combined Freedom House score. In rder to aid in the ease of understanding and 
interpreting the statistical analysis on the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth, I will invert the 1 to 7 scale so that it runs from 0 (not free) to 6 
(free) so that the higher the number on the scale, the higher the level of democracy.  
This will make the correlation and regression results easier to understand since the 
scales run in the same direction. Freedom House has published the ratings, most 
recently for 194 countries, since 1972.  
 
b. Economic Growth 
I will operationalize economic growth as the annual change (increase or decrease) in 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.  This widely used measure is 
calculated by dividing GDP (quantity of goods and services produced in a country for 
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any given year) by the population size. For the study, I will use the growth rate of the 
RGDPCH
59
 (real GDP per capita) variable calculated by Penn World Table.  Using a 
base year (which adjusts for inflation) of 2005 makes this calculation more easily 
comparable across countries over time.  While GDP per capita does provide a general 
measure of the standard of living per person, it does not address dispersion or national 
income equality within a country. 
Testing Alternative Hypotheses 
To address the argument from some critics who might say that the economic growth 
attained in sub-Saharan Africa in the 2000s is due to factors other than 
democratization, I have included the following control variables: 
 Good Governance 
From a policy and institutionalization perspective, some critics may point to the 
increase in good governance initiatives implemented in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
early to mid 1990s as having a potentially larger impact on economic growth during 
the late 1990s and 2000s rather than increased democratization. Indeed, powerful IFIs 
such as the World Bank and other international organizations such as the United 
Nations (through the United Nations Development Programme - UNDP
v
) have 
promoted democracy as well as transparent and accountable governance as part of 
their development plans.  
Daniel Kaufman et al define governance, broadly, as “the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
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To operationalize governance and test for its relationship with economic growth I will 
use three (Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality) of the six 
different indicators developed by Kaufman and his colleagues at the World Bank. All 
three of these indicators capture elements that are important to economic growth and 
development and could potentially have a stronger relationship with the dependent 
variable. The Government Effectiveness dimension captures perceptions of the 
“quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies.”
61
 The Rule of Law measures “perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.”
62
 Finally, the Regulatory Quality measure captures 
“perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.”
63
 These 
governance measures are drawn from diverse sources that are then aggregated and 
weighted according to the team’s methodology.     
While countries can be considered democratic and have low governance scores and 
vice versa, I believe that more democratic countries will also perform better on 
governance measures. To verify this hypothesis, I will look to see how certain 
governance measures interact with levels of democracy and the ensuing economic 
growth during the period under investigation. 
 Economic Liberalization 
Other scholars may point to economic liberalization policies (specifically, SAPs) 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s as potential drivers of economic growth in the 
2000s. Although SAPs have largely been viewed by developing country governments 
and development agencies as worsening the situation in SSA’s most vulnerable 
countries, there are also many who believe that these policies were necessary in order 
for SSA to address “existing macroeconomic problems and the structural constraints 























 While growth has ranged widely for SSA countries, it has improved and 
stabilized for many countries and some researchers point to adjustment policies, 
rather than democratization, as a key to the “major turnaround in the region’s overall 
economic performance” that began in 1995.
65
 
Set against the backdrop of rising import prices, declining export prices and drought 
in many SSA countries, SAPs were mainly implemented and administered by the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund in order to rectify inappropriate 
economic policies pervasive throughout SSA.
66
 The reforms addressed the serious 
problems related to “price distortions (notably overvalued exchange rates), poor 
investment choices, increasing budget deficits, a proliferation of loss-making public 
enterprises, growing inflationary pressures, and a loss of international 
competitiveness.” In order to tackle these problems the IMF and World Bank advised 
countries to reduce government spending, tighten monetary supply through high 
interest rates or limited access to credit, eliminate subsidies for food (particularly 
agricultural products), privatize entities previously operated by the government and 
reduce barriers to trade, foreign direct investment and ownership.
67
 The aim of these 
policies was to improve the economic performance of all participating developing 
economies by increasing reliance on market forces, reducing state intervention and 
keeping expenditure to a minimum.  
In the late 1990s the World Bank produced several reports that assess sub-Saharan 
Africa’s compliance to recommended reforms. The most recent report was prepared 
in 1997 and reviews the bank’s experience with adjustment lending from 1980 to 
1996 in 37 SSA countries.  The World Bank produced compliance ratings for each 
participant country based on indices created from three policy arenas - 
macroeconomic policy, public-sector management, and private-sector development - 
and captures both initial loan agreements and eventual policy shortfalls and 
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 Within these three broad categories, there are also a number of sub-
categories, as follows: 
Macroeconomic Policy: includes all conditions regarding fiscal deficit 
reduction, fiscal revenues, public expenditure levels, exchange rate, etc;   
Public-Sector Management: includes civil service reform, public expenditure 
reform and public enterprise restructuring and privatization; and 
Private-Sector Development: financial sector reform, trade policy reform, 
pricing policies and incentives, and regulatory environment.
69
  
The World Bank then grouped the scores for each country into good, weak and poor 
compliance levels based upon an underlying score that ranges from one (complete 
compliance) to four (total lack of compliance). I will operationalize economic 
liberalization by using these broad categories of adherence to SAPs in order to test 
whether the steps taken to improve macroeconomic policy, public-sector management 
and private-sector development in the 1980s and 1990s had any effect on economic 
growth from 1996 to 2007. 
 Resource-Rich Economies 
Some critics may say that the real cause of the recent economic growth is tied to the 
disproportionately large increase in the demand and prices of commodities within a 
few of SSA’s resource-exporting economies.  It is true that very high growth in a 
handful of SSA countries could mask much weaker growth experienced by the 
majority of countries in the region, but I will be able to control for this effect through 
my statistical analysis.  
Generally, I believe that this hypothesis misses the point with regard to the benefits 
and ability of democracy to increase economic growth stably over the long-term.  
While nominal growth rates may not be as high for democracies without resources as 
for those that are resource-rich, I believe that the growth relationship with democracy 
is still strong for more democratic countries and that many resource-rich economies 
are likely not as democratic.  In addition, resource-rich and commodity driven 
economies are often caught in a cycle of boom and bust so that even if a resource-rich 
economy grows exponentially one year, it might suffer a contraction the next, making 
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the job of managing these economies tricky for governments on many levels. Again, I 
believe that a democratic foundation helps stabilize economic growth. 
In order to test this hypothesis, I will use criteria based on the work of Collier & 
O’Connell (2006) that uses data stretching back to the 1960s.  Collier and O’Connell 
define countries as resource-rich based on the first year the country satisfied the 
following criteria: 
 current rents from energy, minerals and forests exceed 5% of GNI; 
 a forward moving average of these rents exceeds 10% of GNI; and 
 the share of primary commodities in exports exceeds 20% for at 
least a 5-year period following this initial year.
70
 
The IMF uses similar groupings based on the authors’ work, which is “meant to 
identify countries in which natural resource wealth is large enough to play a central 
role in economic management and in the interface of the country with global 
markets.”
71
 In accordance with the annual IMF Regional Outlook: Sub-Saharan 
Africa publications, I will breakdown resource-rich economies into oil and non-oil 
exporters throughout the period under study. By Collier and O’Connell’s standards, 
only Equatorial Guinea (1996) and Ethiopia (1994) became resource-rich during the 
period under examination. All designations made by the IMF remained consistent 
with no countries transitioning between oil and non-oil resource wealth. All of the 
other countries have been considered resource-rich based on the aforementioned 
criteria from the 1960s and 1970s (a full list of Resource Rich countries is available in 
the Descriptive Statistics section that follows).  
   Countries Caught in Poverty Traps 
Beyond the typical economic and political conditions and policies used to explain 
economic growth, economist Paul Collier has identified four poverty traps that keep 
the bottom billion of the world’s population mired in poverty, war and isolation. 
Collier describes the countries where the bottom billion reside as generally 
characterized by high indebtedness, low income, little or no GDP growth and small 
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populations.  Furthermore, Collier posits that the reason these countries are among the 
poorest in the world is that they are caught in one or more poverty traps, as follows: 
 Conflict:  patterns of violent internal challenges to government 
such as civil war, coup d’état and other political conflict keep 




 Natural Resource: mismanaged resource wealth in small, 
developing countries can lead to conflict, corruption or limit 
economic growth of other export activities (e.g., Dutch 




 Landlocked with Bad Neighbors: elevated overland shipping 
costs (versus shipping costs for countries with a coast), 
particularly through neighboring countries where lack of 
infrastructure, corruption or violence are rife, often relegates 
landlocked countries to diminished returns and opportunities 
(this is especially true for non resource-rich countries).
74
  
 Bad Governance in a Small Country: excellent governance and 
economic policies can help the growth process up to a point, 
but terrible policies can much more quickly destroy a country 




Collier believes that 80% of the five billion people that live in developing countries 
are on a solid path towards development – it is the other 20% (the bottom billion) who 
live in countries where development has been stagnant or contracting in recent 
decades.
76
 Although Collier did not specifically identify the countries that are home to 
his bottom billion in his first book (The Bottom Billion) due to the fact that “this is not 
company that countries are keen to be in, and because stigmatizing a country tends to 
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create a self-fulfilling prophecy,”
77
 he does disclose a list in a subsequent book called 
Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. Collier ultimately disclosed 
the list so that policies and aid can be focused and disbursed where it is most needed. 
I have operationalized this variable by using Collier’s list, but categorizing them 
myself using various sources. Incorporating poverty traps as a variable will provide an 
interesting check on the existing arguments that focus on the causality arrow running 
between democracy and growth.  If any relationship exists at all between countries 
that are stuck in a poverty trap and growth I would expect it to be negative. 
IV. A SUMMARY OF VARIABLES AND INDICATORS 
 
To restate, the key variables and measures are: 
Dependent Variable: economic growth: annual growth rate of real GDP per capita
78
 
measure from Penn World Tables; 
Independent Variable:  level of democracy: Freedom House measure of political 
rights and civil liberties; and 
Control Variables:  
1. Good Governance – Governance Matters VIII score for Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality from 1996. 
2. Economic Liberalization – Overall assessment of adherence to SAPs 
from 1980 to 1996, based on a score of 1 to 4 categorized into good, weak 
or poor compliance levels as presented in a 1997 World Bank report. 
3. Resource-Rich Economies – Designation based on the measures outlined 
by Collier and O’Connell (2006). 
4. Poverty Traps – Designation of poverty traps (Conflict, Natural 
Resource, Landlocked with Bad Neighbors and Bad Governance in a 
Small Country) using various sources from a list of countries identified by 
Collier in his book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous 
Places. 
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I will also control for initial levels of wealth using GNI per capita, PPP and whether 
or not a country is an oil importing or exporting country based on IMF classifications. 
While the data for the dependent and independent variables are available for each year 
for the relevant period under study, the other control variables are not.  The good 
governance indicators, which are the best around, are only available beginning in 
1996 and while this is one year after the initial period for which democracy will be 
examined (1988-1995) it is very likely that almost all of the policies were 
implemented earlier in the period so that the review in 1996 is capturing effects from 
prior years.  The year 1996 was also early on in the plan led by IFIs and other 
organizations to promote good governance. 
Likewise, the World Bank review of adjustment lending was published in 1997.  
While the report examines lending through the end of 1996 (just over the 1988 to 
1995 period), none of the loans made in 1996 were examined. Accordingly, while the 
dates in the report do not fall exactly within the 1988-1995 period during which I am 
examining the independent variable, the substance of the report reflects accurately 
this period, but with an earlier start (1980).   
The resource-rich designation has stayed within the bounds of the 1988-1995 period 
while the poverty trap measure is a little more fluid.  I had to use my judgment and 
various sources to try to group each country into each applicable poverty trap that 
applied during the 1988-1995 period.  Some of these traps are not based on events 
(e.g., landlocked), which makes those designations somewhat easier.   
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research design is cross-sectional and longitudinal, enabling the study to test for 
correlation and conduct multivariable analysis to control for n
th
 variables.  The main 
hypothesis will be considered separately, testing economic growth as a function of the 
level of democracy across 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  The unit of analysis 
will be country and the level of analysis for democracy and economic growth will be 
macro as this is a cross-country comparison. 
To provide an overall assessment of the impact of the change in the level of 















over several periods from 1996-2007 or based on election history) in SSA, I will 
perform the quantitative analysis using two different statistical tests:  bivariate 
correlation and multiple regression.  First, I will test whether there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the following variables: 
Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa  
 the absolute level of democracy for all sub-Saharan African 
countries in 1995; and 
 the change in the level of democracy based on the Freedom House 
score for the year in which the first free and fair or first competitive 
national election is held (during the 1988-1995 period) and the 
Freedom House score 3 years prior to that election [FH Election – 
FH Score 3 YR Prior = Change in Level of Democracy].  For this 
part of the analysis, countries that held an election before or after 
this period will not be considered to have democratized during the 
period and will be excluded. 
and; 
Growth of GDP per capita  
 for the absolute level of democracy at 1995, the average annual 
rate of growth of GDP per capita over four periods: 1996-1998, 
1996-2001, 1996-2004 and 1996-2007; and 
 for the change in democracy test, the average annual rate of growth 
of GDP per capita beginning in the first year following the election 
over five periods: 3-year average, 6-year average, 9-year average, 
12-year average, and 12+ year average. In addition, I will also 
measure the 3-year period prior to the election. 
I first test the bivariate relationship of democracy and growth with the control 
variables.  Then I will test the bivariate relationship between democracy, growth and 
the control variables to see if any of the independent variables are highly correlated.   
From there I will conduct a multiple regression using the four main additional 
independent variables plus the two other control variables to see if they have any 















several explanatory (independent or predictor) variables in order to explain as much 
of the variability in the dependent variable as efficiently as possible.  The aim of this 
analysis is to select from the available data those variables that best predict the 
dependent variable (economic growth). Based on these results I will be able to 
determine, from my chosen variables, whether the level of democracy or the other 
variables have a stronger relationship with economic growth. 
Virtually all of the scores used for the good governance measures (based on the three 
different indicators I am using: Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and 
Regulatory Quality) lie between 2.5 to -2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better 
outcomes. The economic liberalization measure is based on a scale from one to four 
with higher levels corresponding to worse compliance.  These scores are further 
grouped into ordinal variables based on level of adherence: good, weak or poor and 
not applicable. The resource-rich variable, which is a categorical/nominal variable, 
yes or no, will be turned into a (1/0) dummy variable.  Finally, the poverty trap 
variable is a categorical/nominal variable based on the four different traps.  This will 
also be turned into a (1/0) dummy variable.  The control for initial levels of wealth 
will use GNI per capita, PPP and the oil importing/ exporting will use a (1/0) dummy 
variable.  
The first step in performing the correlation will be to run a test incorporating the 
different measures of democracy with the different measures of economic growth and 
then adding the control variables.  For the multiple regression analysis I will use the 
time periods appropriate for the change or absolute level of democracy and then add 
the control variables to see how that affects the predictive value (if any) of democracy 
on economic growth.  
Time Lags 
I do not expect that an improvement in the level of democracy will result in an 
immediate increase in economic growth.  In all likelihood, the effect is lagged as the 
rights, policies and institutionalization inherent in most democracies take time to take 
hold. Newly democratic countries might also continue to be challenged as “the 















status quo (e.g. Argentina in the early 1970s; Bolivia in the early 1980s).”
79
 There is 
little research done on potential lags surrounding democratization and the effect on 
economic growth, but one recent study, which examines the time horizon of within-
country comparisons versus cross-country comparisons, by Papaioannou and 
Siourounis, finds evidence that democratization positively affects growth by 0.5 – 
1.0%. The team compared real GDP growth to the global growth rate for the years 
surrounding a successful democratization and found that “in the short run, there may 
be non-negligible transition costs, but in the long-run growth stabilises at higher 
rates.”
80
 These democratizations were usually preceded by consistently low or a sharp 
drop in GDP and this is similar to what historical data show for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Papaioannou and Siourounis consider short-run democratization the first 3 years after 
the democratization event, medium-run the next 3 years and long-run 7+ years after 
democratization.  I will employ similar time lags of 3 years, 6 years, 9 years, 12 years 
and 12+ years when analyzing the impact of democracy on economic growth.  
Endogeneity 
Several alternative economic growth explanations have been discussed in this chapter.  
The factors underlying these possible explanations will be analyzed further in the 
Descriptive Statistics and Research Findings chapters. One other potential issue, 
endogeneity, should be considered as well.  Historically speaking, the causal arrow 
has generally pointed from economic growth leading to democracy, whereas this 
study has turned this around and looks for causality to run the other way – democracy 
leading to economic growth.  Introducing the possibility of endogeneity between the 
variables results in a situation where one could say that a higher level of democracy 
(or liberalized economy, natural resources, good governance, etc.) is likely to be a 
determinant of economic growth as well as one of its outcomes (reverse causation). 
this endogenous relationship may potentially skew the results of the multiple 
regression.  This study will use time-lagged variables as a way to address the possible 
effects of endogeneity in the study, with a recommendation that future study use more 
sophisticated methods to contain this issue.   
 
Case Selection 
The reliability and validity of this study are enhanced by the number of cases (47, 
which is all of SSA except for Somalia) that I will examine.  However, this might also 
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open the study up for criticism that the conclusions are not broadly applicable given 
the diversity of the countries in the sample.  Whether or not there is a positive or 
negative correlation between the level of democracy and economic growth, I believe 
that this study will provide a good indication of the relationship within an African 
context, which is important for this study and future studies.  The data I have 
collected are largely complete for the sample of countries and will be noted when 
unavailable.  I will also remove any variables that are clearly outliers, as this may 
unnecessarily skew the results. 
Data Set 
The data set that I constructed is derived from several different sources. For the 
dependent variable I accessed Penn World Table 6.3 for the annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita.  
For the independent variables, I accessed Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 
ratings for the years 1985-2007 to measure level of freedom, which is used as a proxy 
for the level of democracy. To measure good governance I used data from Kaufman et 
al 2009 that measures Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Regulatory 
Quality on a scale from 2.5 to -2.5.  For economic liberalization, I used a 1997 study 
prepared by the World Bank called Adjustment Lending in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Update.  The study reviews the level of compliance with adjustment lending from 
1980-1996. To measure resource-rich countries I used a report by Collier & 
O’Connell 2006 that indicated when a country became resource-rich according to 
certain criteria.  To determine whether countries have fallen into one of the 4 poverty 
traps identified by Collier, I used various sources (CIA World Fact Book and Collier 
and O’Connell 2006, among others) to determine the traps into which each of the 
countries on Collier’s list falls.  For GNI per capita, PPP I accessed the World Bank’s 
Africa Development Indicator database and for Oil Importing/Exporting status I used 
IMF Regional Economic Outlook reports for sub-Saharan Africa. 
VI.   EXPECTATIONS 
 
Overall, I expect to find a statistically significant, but fragile, relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. I expect to find that higher levels of democracy 















correlate to lower levels of economic growth.  Based on theories and empirical 
evidence from prior studies over earlier periods there should at least be a weak 
relationship for this period, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa.  Because economic 
growth is affected by many different variables, I do also expect to find some 
relationship between the control variables and economic growth when I run the 
















CHAPTER THREE: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Before testing for any relationship between democracy and economic growth, I will 
first describe the independent and dependent variables in terms of their levels and 
trends over the period of study. I will begin with the level of democracy and growth 
of GDP per capita for all sub-Saharan countries.  
For democracy, the independent variable, I will discuss both the absolute level at 
1995 and the degree of change (relative to the first free and fair or first competitive 
national election) over the period and provide charts and graphs depicting these 
different measures.  For the dependent variable, economic growth, I will examine the 
average level of growth over the period using charts and graphs to help depict the 
economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Lastly, I will describe each of the most likely confounding “third” variables that 
might better explain the link between growth: 1) initial levels of wealth; 2) levels of 
good governance; 3) implementation of economic reforms; 4) levels of resource 
dependence in an economy; 5) presence or absence of poverty traps; as well as 6) 
whether the economy is oil importing/exporting. 
I. LEVEL OF DEMOCRACY 
 
I will measure the level of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa from 1988 to 1995 in 
two ways. First, I will use the absolute level of democracy in 1995, the year before I 
start to look for a relationship with economic growth. Second, I will calculate the 
change in Freedom House score for countries that democratized during the 1988 to 
1995 period.  These scores will be calculated based on the difference between the 
level of democracy during the year in which a country holds its first free and fair 
election during the period 1988 to 1995 and the level of democracy three years prior 
to that election. If a free and fair election was not held during the period under study, I 
will then use the first competitive national election (defined as where opposition 
political parties actually win legislative seats) that occurred during the period under 
study. Countries that held neither a first free and fair nor a first competitive national 















Overview - Average 
For descriptive purposes an average provides a good snapshot of the levels of 
democracy in the region over time.  The graph below provides a broad overview, 
showing the average Freedom House score for SSA from the index’s inception (1972) 
through 2007.  The level of democracy has clearly improved over the past 35 years 
but what is most notable is the dip democracy took during the 1980s.  This is likely 
due to the economic and political fallout from oil price shocks and Cold War politics. 
Figure 3.1: Average Freedom House Score for SSA 1972-2007 
 
A look at the average Freedom House score during the period under study (1988 to 
1995) illustrates a positive trend over this time, from 1.28 (on an inverted scale of 0 to 
6, with 6 the highest level of democracy) in 1988 to 2.11 in 1991 and ultimately to 













































































































































































Figure 3.2:  Average Freedom House Score for SSA 1988-1995 
 
Although interesting for descriptive purposes, the average Freedom House score over 
this period is not the most useful measure for this analysis because it does not easily 
identify which countries democratized (e.g., measuring an absolute change based on 
an event such as an election and the corresponding change in the level of democracy).  
For example, the vast difference between the level of democracy for Equatorial 
Guinea and Mauritius, which have essentially stayed at the same level of democracy 
(whether high or low) throughout the period, is seen as equivalent when measuring 
the absolute change (they would both have close to a 0 change value).  Because of 
this, I want to pay particular attention to the countries that went through some form of 
democratization during the period.   
Absolute Level of Democracy – Freedom House Score at 1995 
The first measure of democracy will simply take the level at 1995, which my study 
assumes to be the high water mark for democracy in SSA during the 1990s.  The chart 
below provides a comparison between the level of democracy (based on Freedom 
House categories) in 1988 versus 1995.  Based on inverted levels of freedom defined 
by Freedom House (free, partly free, not free), there is a noticeable shift in the 
number of countries that were Not Free in 1988 compared with the number that were 


































































































Figure 3.3:  Level of Democracy for SSA 1988 vs. 1995 
 
The table below presents the countries in each group based on the level of democracy 
for 1995.  As mentioned above, many countries transitioned into higher levels of 
democracy from 1988, but a few also became less democratic.  The countries at the 
highest level, Free, have remained, with the exception of Malawi, which has dropped 
slightly, and addition of Ghana, strong democracies to present.  Interestingly, the 
countries categorized as Free represent a mix of strong and weaker economies, which, 
on the surface, refutes the argument that democracies are, by definition, wealthy.  
Countries categorized in the Partly Free level of democracy encompass a wide range 
of regimes and true to the label ‘partly’, some of the countries have adopted different 
aspects of democracy to different degrees.  There is strong potential for many of the 
countries listed as Partly Free to transition to the level of Free.  Many of the countries 
found at the Not Free level have transitioned to Partly Free since 1995, but a few 
countries (e.g., Congo, Dem. Rep., Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan) have 
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Table  3.1:  Level of Democracy for SSA at 1995  
Level Of Democracy at 
1995
Benin Malawi Namibia 
Botswana Mali São Tomé & Príncipe 
Cape Verde Mauritius South Africa
Burkina Faso Ghana Senegal 
Central African Rep. Guinea-Bissau Seychelles 
Comoros Lesotho Tanzania 
Congo Rep. Madagascar Uganda 






Burundi Gambia Rwanda 
Cameroon Guinea Sierra Leone 
Chad Kenya Sudan
Congo Dem. Rep. Liberia Swaziland 
Côte d’Ivoire Mauritania Togo
Djibouti
Countries
Free (6.0 to 4.5)
Partly Free (4.0-2.0)
Not Free (1.5 to 0.0)
 
Change in Freedom House Score from 1988 to 1995 
The second way I have measured the level of democracy is by calculating the change 
in democracy for each country during the period 1988 to 1995.  To calculate this 
variable I started with the level of democracy as measured during the year that the 
country held its first free and fair national election. If this did not occur during the 
period under study I then looked to see if the country held a first competitive national 
election during the period.  I then subtracted the level of democracy as measured 3 
years prior to that point. Looking back 3 years sufficiently captures the effects of 
democratic shift as reflected by the Freedom House score. Although I would expect 
the large majority of these calculations to be positive, it is possible that a country 
could have reversed course (e.g., a flawed election or some other political disruption 
that set the country back in level of democracy).  Accordingly, a negative number 
would indicate a drop in the level of democracy (backsliders) while a positive number 






In a few instances, the country’s first election was held between 1988 and 1990 
(Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire and Namibia), forcing me to go outside the range of 1988 to 
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 Standpatter, a term used by Samuel Huntington in his work The Third Wave, refers to people in 
















1995 in order to calculate the change variable.  In these few instances, however, the 
country’s score did not substantially change. Fully 36 of 47 countries in SSA held a 
first free and fair or first national competitive election during this period. 
Finally, countries that did not hold either a first free and fair or a first national 
competitive election from 1988 to 1995 were not included in this portion of the 
analysis.  The reason being is that these countries, although they may be consolidated 
democracies or authoritarian regimes, did not democratize (according to my 
methodology) during the period under study.  Eleven countries fall into this category. 
The chart below depicts the countries according to the degree of democratic change. I 
have categorized them as High (6.0 – 4.0), Medium (3.50-2.0), Low (1.50 – 0.50), 
Standpatters (0.0), and Backsliders (< 0.0).  Even though a change of 1.50 points is 
considered Low, for a country that began at zero, this is a substantial improvement in 
the level of democracy over this period.  The greater the score, the more drastic the 
change witnessed from the first free and fair or first competitive national election. The 
Standpatters, per definition, remained stagnant throughout all of this, neither 
advancing nor declining. The average Freedom House score for this group was a low 
1.0. 
Figure 3.4:  Change in Freedom House Score 1988-1995 
 
The following table presents the composition of each group based on the change in 
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Senegal) and the maximum was 4.5 (Benin) and the sample had a mean and standard 
deviation of 1.31 and 1.47, respectively (see the Appendix for more detail). 
Table 3.2:  Change in Level of Democracy 1988-1995 
Change in Level Of Democracy 1988-1995
Benin, 
Malawi
Cape Verde, Lesotho South Africa 
Central African Rep. Mali Seychelles
Congo Rep. Namibia Zambia
Guinea-Bissau Niger
Angola Equatorial Guinea Madagascar
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Mozambique






Gabon  Senegal 
Botswana Liberia Sudan
Chad Mauritius Uganda 
Congo Dem. Rep. Rwanda Zimbabwe






High (6.0 – 4.0) São Tomé & Príncipe
Medium (3.5- 2.0)
 
The graph below, with data taken from Mattes & Bratton 2009, shows the number of 
first free and fair or first competitive national elections held in SSA from 1988 to 
1995.82  The substantial number of first elections, particularly during the 1991-1993 
period, clearly reflects the second independence or third wave of democratization of 







                                                        
















Figure 3.5:  First Free and Fair or First Competitive National Elections Held in SSA 1988-1995  
 
II. ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Economic growth is measured by the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
Using data from the Penn World Table I have calculated the average growth rate over 
the period of study (1996-2007), broken down into four sub-periods for the level of 
democracy at 1995 and six sub-periods for the change in the level of democracy 
analysis. Please note that any reference to economic growth, growth or GDP refers to 
real Gross Domestic Product per capita levels as defined in the Key Concepts section.   
Before I present the data associated with the period under study I think it is important 
to first look at GDP growth and level of democracy together over the past few 
decades. Getting a broad perspective of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic performance 
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Figure 3.6:  GDP Growth (1961-2007) and Freedom House Score (1972-2007) 
 
The graph above shows that there has been a steady rise in democracy in SSA since 
Freedom House started scoring countries in 1972.  The pronounced dip in the average 
Freedom House score in SSA from the early 1980s through the late 1980s co-occurred 
with poor governance, deteriorating economic conditions, civil strife and drought, 
among other events. 



























































































































GDP Growth (1961-2007) and  






































































































































































Looking at economic growth alone in the graph above, one can see the fairly strong 
and stable growth that SSA experienced in the 1960s (these were the years following 
independence for most nations) when the average annual growth rate was 2.16%.  
This fell to 1.65% in the 1970s and then to 0.21% in the 1980s following the global 
oil shocks in the mid to late 1970s and introduction of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) in many sub-Saharan countries in the 1980s and early 1990s. Growth reached 
its nadir at (1.84%) during the 1989 to 1994 period (the average for the entire 1990s 
was 0.57%) and then improved in the second half of the 1990s and through to 2007 
with an average annual growth of GDP around 2.42% (growth from 2000-2007 was 
2.11%). Since these numbers are averages, they do mask some rather large disparities 
in growth rates among the 47 countries in the sample.  Some countries experienced 
growth of over 100% in some years while others experienced negative growth of 10-
20%. In spite of this, the simple average gives a good indication of overall trends for 
the past 45+ years. 
Collier and O’Connell find that the simple average of GDP does not provide the best 
description of how the average African fared in terms of economic growth.  While the 
simple average is perfectly fine for an analysis, the authors believe that a population-
weighted GDP calculation provides a better description of how the region fared. SSA 
has many small countries with small populations that can wield substantial influence 
when included in a simple average. While GDP-weighted calculations will reflect the 
performance of the economic “whale” in this category, South Africa, which accounts 
for around half of GDP in SSA, a population-weighted average will better reflect the 
effect of economic growth of a more populous country like Nigeria, which as the 
home of 1 in 5 Africans, is the demographic “whale” on the continent.
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Based on Collier and O’Connell’s calculations, sub-Saharan Africa performed far 
worse over the decades from 1960 to 2000 than the simple average indicates (see the 
table below for a comparison). Average annual GDP growth was 1.04% in the 1960s, 
0.86% in the 1970s, -0.79% in the 1980s and -0.46% in the 1990s. Furthermore, 
neither the simple average nor the GDP/population-weighted averages take into 
account the dispersion of economic growth among a population.  Growth may be high 
but it might also go directly to the business and political elite in a society, creating 
                                                        















high inequality at the micro level.  This sort of analysis, while very interesting, is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 






Population Weighted Average 
1960s 2.16% 1.04% 
1970s 1.65% 0.86% 
1980s 0.21% -0.79% 
1990s 0.57% -0.46% 
 
Since it is highly unlikely that changes in the level of democracy are quickly matched 
by a corresponding change in economic growth I will present the average growth for 
sub-Saharan Africa in two ways, focusing on periods: 
 In accordance with the absolute level of democracy at 1995, I will break the 
subsequent 12-year period into four different sub-periods: one short-term 
(1996-1998), two medium-terms (1996-2001) & (1996-2004) and one long-
term (1996-2007).  
 In accordance with the change in level of democracy calculation following the 
first free and fair or first competitive national election year, I will calculate 
GDP growth beginning the year after the election for 5 sub-periods: a 3-year 
average, a 6-year average, a 9-year average, a 12-year average, and a 12+ year 
average (since the election years are different for many countries, this period 
will measure the longest term for each. Although this duration will vary in 
length from country to country, it is at least 12 years). To get a glimpse of 
what was occurring economically for a country in the lead up to its election, I 
will also calculate the 3-year average for the period prior to the election. 
The graph below gives a snapshot of the annual economic growth during the entire 
period under study (1988-2007) and provides a dramatic look at the tumultuous years 
of economic contraction leading up to and during the third wave of democratization.  
Focusing specifically on the years from 1996 to 2007 shows that average growth was 
not only entirely positive during this time period, but it was also more stable than in 
previous years (particularly the late 1980s and early 1990s), with some of the highest 


















Figure 3.8: Average Annual GDP Growth for SSA (1998-2007) 
 
Average Annual Growth – 1996-2007 
Testing for a relationship between democracy and growth using the level of 
democracy at 1995 allows for an analysis of all countries following the same base 
year. To restate my original premise, I do not believe that an increase in the level of 
democracy will have an immediate effect (e.g., within 12 months) on economic 
growth, but rather provide a more stable, steady and positive growth trajectory once 
the democratization process begins. On the other hand, decreases in the level of 
democracy might indeed have more immediate effects because of disastrous 
economic policies and bureaucracies, military action or civil unrest. Either way, I will 
begin to measure the change in economic growth in 1996 (the year after the high-
water mark for the level of democracy during the period) in order to see how 
democracy affects economic growth over the short, medium and long-terms. 
The graph below provides a breakdown of the four periods by country based on four 
different levels of economic growth that I have established: > 5.0%, 4.99-2.50%, 
2.49-0.0% and < 0.0% (see the Appendix for more detail).  The longer time periods 
tended to slightly smooth out the averages to higher levels.  The 1996-2001 period 













































































































































periods and this could be because of the tech bubble bursting (and ensuing recession) 
in Western economies.  The highest level of growth category (> 5.0%) has remained 
consistent across the four periods with between 7-9 countries falling into that range.  
Overall, the long-term period has more countries leaning towards the higher GDP 
growth rates, which could be due to the high growth in the global economy or an 
increase in the level of democracy over that time.  
Figure 3.9: Average Annual GDP Growth for SSA 
 
The table below presents a range of descriptive statistics for the four different periods.  
The highest mean (3.24%) and standard deviation (12.07) were recorded during the 
shortest period (1996-1998).  This period also recorded the widest range between the 
average maximum and minimum GDP growth of over 80%.  Over time the means, 
minimum and maximum scores tended to smooth out somewhat (see the Appendix for 
more detail) but the extreme range of these results were mostly driven by a few outlier 
countries (Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Congo, Dem. Rep.) 
that will be discussed later in the analysis.  
Table 3.4: Average Annual GDP Growth in SSA 1996-2001 
Average Annual GDP Growth in SSA – 1996-2001 
Period Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1996-1998 -16.22% 70.09% 3.24 12.07 
1996-2001 -7.34% 49.73% 2.62 8.31 








































Average Annual GDP Growth for SSA  
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0-2.49% 
















1996-2007 -6.36% 30.56% 2.42 5.19 
 
Change in Annual Growth – From First Free and Fair or First Competitive National 
Election (1988-1995) Through 2007 
For the analysis based on the first election held during the 1988 to 1995 period, the 
goal is to measure economic growth beginning in the year after the election (in six 
sub-periods) through the end of the period (2007).  From a timing perspective, this 
will put all of the countries that experienced one of the defining characteristics of 
democracy (an election) in the same group.  As previously mentioned, I will look 
back three years from the first free and fair or first competitive national election to 
measure the change in the level of democracy.  For economic growth I will look at 
five subsequent periods (a 3-year, a 6-year, a 9-year, a 12-year, and a 12+ year period) 
beginning in the year following the election.  I will also calculate the 3-year average 
GDP growth for the period prior to election to see what the general trend was there. 
The chart below reflects a shift from lower growth averages in the years immediately 
following an election to somewhat higher growth averages over the longer (9, 12 and 
12+ year averages).  However, when taking into account the 3-year period prior to the 
election year, which had lower growth rates across the board, one can see (at least on 
the surface) that growth does appear to improve slightly following an election.  I will 
explore this relationship further during the correlation analysis, but this gives a good 
visual description of the general trends, which is consistent with the trend in the graph 
depicting the annual GDP growth in SSA. 
















The table below presents a range of descriptive statistics for the six different periods.  
The highest mean (2.02%) was recorded during the longest period (12+ Year Avg) 
and this period also had the lowest standard deviation of all the periods measured 
following the election year.  Interestingly, the 3-year period prior to the election had 
the lowest mean (-0.49%) and standard deviation (3.35).  Over time, the means 
steadily improved and the minimum and maximum scores tended to smooth out 
somewhat as well (see the Appendix for more detail).  
Table 3.5: Average Annual GDP Growth – Six Periods Pre/Post-Election 
Average Annual GDP Growth – Six Periods Pre/Post Election 
Period Pre/Post 
Election 
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
3-Yr Avg Pre -8.31% 10.90% -0.49 3.35 
3-Yr Avg Post -4.59% 21.15% 0.76 4.52 
6-Yr Avg Post -4.45% 36.66% 1.62 6.40 
9-Yr Avg Post -3.52% 35.25% 1.66 6.11 
12-Yr Avg Post -2.96% 29.71% 1.90 5.12 
12+ Yr Avg Post -2.54% 25.40% 2.02 4.50 
 
III. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Good Governance 
The three different good governance indicators that I will use (Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality) from the World Bank study by 
Kaufman et al were presented in a 1996 report.  While this is not ideal because my 
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indicator available and the first year that this report was produced. I believe that this 
source will provide the best proxy for a good governance effect for the period under 
study.  
The components of the governance indicators are gathered from a number of different 
sources: from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks to universities 
and other research databases.  The authors then sorted the data by type (survey, public 
sector org, etc.) and created a weighting for each indicator based on the level of 
information provided by each of the sources.  
The table below provides an overview of the descriptive statistics.  Scores should 
normally fall within the range of 2.5 to -2.5 (higher scores corresponding to better 
outcomes), with scores outside these levels considered outliers.  The scores of two 
countries (Liberia and Democratic Republic of Congo) fell outside this range for the 
Regulatory Quality indicator and three scores (Comoros, São Tomé & Príncipe and 
Seychelles) were unavailable for the Rule of Law indicator.  Generally, the scores and 
means are quite low, with only one indicator reaching 1.00. This reflects a generally 
poor level of governance in SSA.  
Table 3.6: Good Governance Measures 1996 
Good Governance Measures 1996 
Measure Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Rule of Law -2.00 1.00 -0.73 0.73 
Regulatory Quality -3.13 0.74 -0.60 0.83 
Government Effectiveness -1.78 0.60 -0.66 0.56 
 
To see the distribution of the governance scores among the entire sample I have 
prepared the chart below, which groups the countries into four broad categories: 2.5 to 
1.0, 1.0 to 0, 0 to -1.0 and <-1.0. 
 




















The World Bank’s assessment of sub-Saharan Africa’s compliance with its structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) is grouped into three categories as defined by the bank: 
good, weak, and poor. I have added a fourth category of countries that did not have a 
program or where data were unavailable.  A total of 10 countries (comprising 29% of 
the countries reviewed in the study) were deemed as good compliers, 11 (comprising 
32%) were deemed weak compliers, 13 (comprising 38%) were poor compliers 
(Somalia was a poor complier but has been excluded from the study for lack of 
information) and another 13 countries either did not have programs with the World 
Bank or data were unavailable.   
In its review, the Bank notes that poor compliance by a majority of the countries (and 
weak performance by even the best compliers) was due to several factors, both 
exogenous and endogenous, some of which were in the Bank’s control like lack of 
selectivity and poor project design.
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Table 3.7: Compliance with World Bank SAPs 1997 
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Good Compliance Weak Compliance Poor Compliance N/A
Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Angola 
Gambia Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Botswana 
Ghana Guinea Central African Rep. Cape Verde
Malawi Guinea-Bissau Chad Comoros
Mali Madagascar Congo Brazzaville Djibouti 
Mauritania Niger Congo Kinshasa Eritrea 
Mauritius Senegal Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia 
Mozambique Togo Gabon Lesotho 
Sierra Leone Uganda Kenya Liberia  
Tanzania Zambia Nigeria Namibia 
Zimbabwe Rwanda Seychelles 
São Tomé & Príncipe South Africa
Sudan Swaziland
Compliance With 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs 1997
 
These broad categories were based upon an underlying score that ranges from one 
(complete compliance) to four (total lack of compliance).  Based on the 34 countries 
examined, the minimum score was 1.1 and the maximum score was 4.0.  The mean 
and standard deviation were 2.67 and 0.73, respectively.  Overall, both the report and 
the scores indicate that compliance, as measured by the World Bank, with 
requirements under SAPs was generally weak to poor. 
Resource-Rich Economies  
Collier and O’Connell define a country as resource-rich if: current rents from energy, 
minerals and forests exceed 5% of GNI; a forward moving average of these rents 
exceeds 10% of GNI; and the share of primary commodities in exports exceeds 20% 
for at least a 5-year period following this initial year. The authors use these criteria to 
identify countries in which natural resource wealth is large enough to play a central 
role in economic (both at the macro and micro level) management and in the interface 
of the country with global markets.
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 The following table illustrates the breakdown of 
the status of SSA countries in 1995 within the two broad categories of resource-rich 
and not resource-rich: 
Table 3.8: Level of Resource Wealth in SSA 1995 
                                                        
















Burkina Faso Malawi 
Burundi Mali 
Cape Verde Mauritius 
Central Africa Republic Mozambique 
Chad Niger 
Comoros Rwanda  
Congo Dem. Rep. São Tomé & Príncipe 
Côte d’Ivoire Senegal 
Equatorial Guinea Seychelles 
























Approximately 32% (15) of countries in sub-Saharan Africa were considered 
resource-rich at 1995.  A majority of 68% (32) countries were not considered 
resource-rich based on the parameters set out by the authors. This does not mean that 
these countries were not endowed with resources or that they did not receive a portion 
of their GDP by exploiting these resources, it only means that the country did not 
produce resources at a level high enough to fit within the parameters laid out by 
Collier and his colleagues.  
Figure 3.12: SSA Resource-Rich Economies at 1995 
 









































The poverty trap variable adds an interesting angle to the study of the relationship 
between democracy and economic growth.  While the problems that lead to or from 
these traps are grounded in many of the same economic, political, social and 
geographical dynamics that the literature highlights, identifying the traps and all that 
they encompass is more like diagnosing a syndrome with inter-related effects.   Paul 
Collier, the economist that diagnosed the poverty traps of the bottom billion, 
reluctantly released a list of countries that fall into one or more of the traps in his 
book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. With good reason, 
Collier decided not to take the next step and delineate which countries fall into which 
traps.  Therefore, the challenge for me here was to decide, independently, which 
countries fall into which traps. I used a variety of sources such as the CIA World 
Factbook, World Bank reports and various other literature, including some from 
Collier himself.   
Some of the traps, such as landlocked with bad neighbors, are obvious to determine 
but others, like bad governance in a small country and the resource trap are a bit more 
subjective.  I tried to stay within the bounds of the period of the study (1988-1995) as 
much as possible but the decisions were not always clear-cut and the events that may 
dictate whether or not a country falls into a trap did not always stay neatly within this 
time frame.   
There were 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that did not make it on Collier’s list; 
the other 37 fell within one to four traps (see the Appendix for more detail).  The 
chart below gives a breakdown of the number of countries in each trap. 
















It is clear that governance is an issue among many SSA countries – and the 
independent results of the previously mentioned World Bank study seem to confirm 
this.  Mismanagement of resources is not far behind.  Resources can often be a curse 
to a developing country that does not have the institutions or economic development 
to manage the extraction, sale and export of oil, minerals and other commodities in a 
proper way.  The chart below depicts the number of countries that fall into the 































































Initial Levels of Wealth 
Before I delve into the empirical analysis between democracy and growth, it is 
important to note the potential impact of two last third variables, the first being initial 
levels of wealth and the second being a country’s oil importing or exporting status.  If 
I do find a relationship between the level of democracy and economic growth, some 
critics may contend that this relationship is simply based on prior levels of wealth 
(and thus, democracy is a result, not a cause of economic change). As mentioned in 
the State of Knowledge, many scholars believe that democracies are by definition 
wealthy countries and that wealthy countries are more apt to democratize and have 
higher rates of growth. However, wealthier countries themselves are very likely to 
have higher levels of growth.  Controlling for initial levels of wealth will allow me to 
test this theory and refute any suggestion that the only reason that countries with 
higher levels of democracy attained higher levels of growth was due to initial levels 
of wealth. 
I will use GNI per capita, purchasing power parity (PPP) (in current international $) 
from 1995 to control for initial wealth.
vii
 The purchasing power parity (PPP) method 
“provides a better measure of the standard of living of residents of an economy 
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 World Bank Data Catalog – Africa Development Indicators,( http://data.worldbank.org/data-




























Number of Traps 

















The chart below shows the breakdown of GNI into the various income levels.  
Broadly speaking, the World Bank would consider countries in the 0-770 range low 
income, 771-3,000 in the lower middle-income range, 3,001-9,000 in the upper 
middle-income range and > 9,000 in the high-income range, but the World Bank uses 
the Atlas method of GNI per capita to make these designations.  GNI per capita, PPP 
produces a slightly higher value than the Atlas method, but I think GNI PPP, for the 
aforementioned reasons, is a better measure to control for initial wealth.  The 
breakdown by these income levels is for illustrative purposes only. 
Figure 3.15: GNI per capita, PPP (current int’l $) for SSA in 1995 
 




















































GNI per capita, PPP 1995
> 9,001 Gabon Seychelles
Botswana Namibia 
Mauritius South Africa 
Angola Congo, Rep. Kenya 
Benin Côte d’Ivoire Lesotho 
Cameroon Djibouti Mauritania 
Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea Nigeria 
Comoros Gambia Sudan 
Burkina Faso Ghana Niger 
Burundi Guinea Rwanda 
Chad Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone 
Central African Rep. Madagascar Tanzania 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi Togo 
Eritrea Mali Uganda 
Ethiopia Mozambique Zambia
Liberia 
São Tomé & Príncipe 
SSA Countries
3,001 – 9,000 Swaziland
771 – 3,000
0 - 770
Not Applicable Senegal Zimbabwe
 
Oil Importer or Exporter 
The last control variable that I have included simply categorizes each country as 
either an oil importer or exporter, based on annual regional outlook reports for sub-
Saharan Africa from the International Monetary Fund. This classification could affect 
a country’s economic growth in a variety of ways: exporters have the opportunity to 
increase (and just as easily decrease) GDP during commodity booms or busts. For 
importers, oil affects the profitability and development of many industries (e.g., 
energy, manufacturing, infrastructure and food production, to name a few) that are 
often engines of growth for developing countries.  Not that an exporter is immune to 
all of the effects that an importer might have. Oil exporters often have their own set of 
challenges managing wide-ranging cash flows during boom and bust markets and 
corruption. For my study, oil producers will include Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., 
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International Monetary Fund, “Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Economic 
and Financial Surveys (2003-2009) (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/reorepts.aspx?ddlYear=-
















CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
To restate, my main research question seeks to understand better the effect of 
democracy on economic growth in SSA during the period from 1988 to 2007.  My 
hypothesis will test whether countries with higher levels of democracy at 1995 or that 
increased their level of democracy between 1988 and 1995, attained higher levels of 
subsequent economic growth than countries that backtracked, stayed at the same 
levels or had a relatively lower level.   
 
The first part of my analysis will determine whether there is a bivariate correlation 
between the level of democracy and subsequent economic growth.  I will also test to 
see if there is any correlation between the six control variables and the dependent 
variable of growth. 
 
The second part of the analysis will involve a multiple regression. The multiple 
regression will test to see: 1) whether the initial observed relationship of democracy 
and growth remains once the other variables are taken into account; and 2) whether 
any of the six control variables better explains the relationship with economic growth 
than the level of democracy.  
Please note that any reference to economic growth, growth or GDP refers to real 
Gross Domestic Product per capita levels as defined in the Key Concepts section.  
Any reference to GNI refers to Gross National Income per capita as defined in the 
Initial Levels of Wealth section of the Descriptive Statistics chapter. 
Main Hypothesis 
Democracy and economic growth will be measured in two ways: 1) the absolute level 
of democracy at 1995 with economic growth measured in: three, six, nine, and 12-
year averages beginning in 1996; and 2) the change in the level of democracy during 
1988-1995 for countries that held a first free and fair or first competitive national 
election. Economic growth will be measured in: 3, 6, 9, 12 and 12+ year averages 
following the first free and fair or first competitive national election year. I will also 
















Before delving into the analysis I will first examine the data through scatterplot 
graphs.  Scatterplots provide a great visual feel for the data and allow the user to see 
how it is distributed, noting the strength and direction of the relationship between 
variables.   
 
After looking at four different scatterplots for part a) of the main hypothesis above 
(level of democracy at 1995) it became clear that Equatorial Guinea (and depending 
on the year, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone and Congo, Dem. Rep. as well) was an 
outlier mainly due to extraordinary (>100% in one year) levels of economic growth in 
the mid-1990s.  Outliers are atypical, infrequent observations and there is not a 
standardized way to treat them or a certain level at which they must be removed, but I 
have determined that Equatorial Guinea is enough of an outlier, for each of the 
periods of study, to significantly skew the results and potentially mask a relationship 
between democracy and economic growth. 
 
The graph below illustrates the position of Equatorial Guinea and Liberia in relation 
to the rest of the sample.  The fit line in the middle shows that the relationship 






























Figure 4.1: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 with Outliers 
 
 
The scatterplot below shows the same period (1996-1998) but with a positive fit line 
























Figure 4.2: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 without Outliers 
 
After looking at five different scatter plots for part b) of the main hypothesis above 
(level of democracy – change from election) it became clear that Equatorial Guinea 
was an outlier for these periods of study as well.  
 
The scatterplots below depict the change in the level of democracy from three years 
prior to the first free and fair or first competitive national election versus the average 
growth rate of GDP per capita for a 6-year period following the election.  It is clear to 
see that Equatorial Guinea is an outlier for this series as well.  The curved lines 















calculated from a given set of sample data, which is likely to include an unknown 




Figure 4.3: Scatterplot Change in Democracy vs. Growth 6-year Period with Outliers 
 




























Figure 4.4: Scatterplot Change in Democracy vs. Growth 6-year Period without Outliers 
 
As illustrated, outliers can have a strong influence on the slope of the regression line 
and as a result on the value of the correlation coefficient.  For this reason, I will 
remove outliers (and will note this) at various points throughout the analysis. 
 
Further visual inspection of the data through histograms showed that some of the 
GDP data were not normally distributed, but after removing the outliers, the data all 
















I. CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 
Correlations with Average GDP Growth 
The Pearson r correlation is used to measure the degree of the relationship between at 
least two continuous, linear-related variables.  Values closer to +/-1.0 indicate a 
stronger correlation (with values of exactly +/-1.0 perfectly correlated) while values 
closer to zero indicate a weaker correlation.  For the Pearson r correlation, both 
variables should be normally distributed.  Testing for correlation will help me 
determine which measures of democracy and GDP growth have the strongest 
relationship and warrant further examination.    
The following table presents the correlations for the level of democracy (based on the 
level at 1995) and economic growth along with the control variables.  The first 
number corresponds to a sample size of 43 countries and the second number 
(followed by the /) corresponds to the full sample of 47 countries, the difference being 
outliers. 
Table 4.1: Correlations Between Growth, Democracy (at 1995) and Control Variables 
Correlations Between Growth, Democracy (at 1995) 
and Control Variables Over Four Periods 
Period GDP 1996-1998 GDP 1996-2001 GDP 1996-2004 GDP 1996-2007 
Outliers Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan , and 





Sample Size N=43/N=47 N=43/N=47 N=45/N=47 N=45/N=47 
Democracy at 
1995 
.393***/-.142 .380**/-.152 .219/-.141 .142/-.151 
GNI PPP 1995 .150/-.080 .160/-.053 .057/-.015 -.022/-.005 
WB Rule of Law .342**/-.148 .386**/-.112 .229/-.084 .157/-.093 
WB Reg. Quality .138/-.238 .008/-.221 .114/-.143 -.020/-.189 
WB Govt Effect .307**/-.248 .153/-.244* .084/-.228 .042/-.229 
Oil Import or 
Export 
-.018/.299** -.125/.275* .006/.319** .099/.347** 
Resource Rich -.034/-.046 -.182/-.035 .067/.006 .165/.065 
PTrap Conflict -.340**/-.103 -.185/-.060 -.147/-.094 -.153/-.106 
PTrap Resource -.201/.120 -.136/.144 .082/.205 .115/.221 
PTrap Land 
Locked 
.051/-.090 .007/-.157 .007/-.100 -.039/-.118 
PTrap Bad Gov -.228/.066 -.307**/.046 -.325**/-.019 -.348**/-.064 
PTrap Sum -.429***/.003 -.205/-.003 -.160/.005 -.136/-.020 
Econ Lib Scale -.310**/.023 -.388***/-.033 -.163/.041 -.241/-.019 
















The two earlier periods (1996-1998 and 1996-2001), each had four countries that 
were considered outliers due to levels of economic growth that fell beyond the 95% 
confidence level.  At first glance, these results present more interesting opportunities 
to explore.  First, there is a statistically significant relationship between democracy 
and economic growth at the .01 level for the period 1996 to 1998 and at the .05 level 
for the period 1996 to 2001. Yet there are also statistically significant relationships 
between other control variables such as the good governance indicators (World Bank 
Rule of Law and World Bank Government Effectiveness), the poverty traps (the 
conflict trap individually and the sum of the four traps) and the economic 
liberalization variable. There was no correlation found between the initial level of 
wealth (GNI per capita PPP 1995) and economic growth during any of the periods.  
The oil importing/exporting variable became significant at the .05 level when the 
entire sample (with outliers) was tested.  This is likely because Equatorial Guinea has 
an oil-dominant economy.  
The scatter plot below provides a good visual of the relationship between democracy 
and economic growth for the 1996-1998 period. The x-axis shows the level of 
democracy, represented by the Freedom House score.  The y-axis shows economic 
growth represented by the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. The R
2
 of the linear 
fit line equals 0.155, which means that almost 16% of the dependent variable 
(economic growth) for this period is explained by the level of democracy in 1995.  
Values of R
2




























Figure 4.5: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-1998 without Outliers 
The scatter plot below depicts the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth for the period 1996-2001. The R
2
 of the linear fit line equals 0.144, which 
means that approximately 14% of the dependent variable (economic growth) for this 



























Figure 4.6: Scatterplot Democracy at 1995 vs. Growth 1996-2001 without Outliers 
To summarize, the correlation analysis has highlighted that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between democracy and economic growth (on a bivariate 
basis) for the 1996 to 1998 and 1996 to 2001 periods using the level of democracy at 
1995.   
The following table presents the correlations for the level of democracy (based on 















the data for the sample size of 35
88
 (the top number) and sample size of 36 (the 





Table 4.2: Correlations Between Growth, Change in Democracy (First Election) and Control 
Variables  
Correlations Between Growth, Change in Democracy (First Election) 
and Control Variables Over 6 Periods 


















































































































































































































*significant at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level  *** significant at the .01 level   
 
                                                        
















Even after taking into account outliers in the data, the results do not show a strong 
correlation between democracy and economic growth.  The only independent 
variables that show statistically significant relationships with economic growth are the 
economic liberalization variable and the oil importing/exporting variable, but only if 
the outlier is included.  For the six, 9, 12 and 12+ -year average GDP growth, there is 
a statistically significant relationship between economic liberalization and economic 
growth at the .01 level. Since there is not even a minor relationship between 
democracy and economic growth for these measures, I will now move on to the next 
part of the analysis, multiple regression. 
II. MULTIPLE REGRESSION 
 
In the next step of the analysis, I will explore the relationship between democracy at 
1995 and economic growth during 1996-1998 and 1996-2001 using multiple linear 
regression.  The multiple regression will also take into account each of the control 
variables.  This will allow me to determine whether the strength of the relationships 
found in the correlation provide more or less explanatory power than the control 
variables.  
My approach with the multiple regression will first involve a run where all the 
variables are included at the same time. From there, I will add each group of variables 
one at a time to see how that influences the relationship with democracy.  I will first 
examine the period from 1996 to 1998, where there was a strong correlation between 
democracy and economic growth as well as a few other control variables. 
Average GDP Growth 1996-1998 
The initial positive, bivariate correlation that I found between democracy and 
economic growth was .393 at the .01 level of significance.  To investigate this 
correlation further, I performed a linear regression with all six of the control variables 
(good governance indicators, poverty traps, resource wealth, economic liberalization, 
oil importing/exporting, and GNI PPP).   
Adding all of the variables into the regression yielded some interesting results, which 
I have presented in Table 4.4 below.  As it turns out, democracy does not retain its 















significance and predictive power in the analysis was oil importing/exporting status at 
.01 level of significance.  Two other variables, the World Bank’s Government 
Effectiveness indicator and the poverty trap – landlocked with bad neighbors, each 
registered a weaker .10 level of significance. These results seem to lean more towards 
the argument that oil wealth provides a bigger boost to economic growth than do 
democracy, economic liberalization and good governance. The positive relationship 
between poverty trap - landlocked with bad neighbors and growth seems spurious as 
being landlocked in SSA and having high economic growth is counterintuitive.  At 
first glance, these results refute the poverty trap argument and that resource-rich 
economies drive economic growth in SSA.   
Table 4.4: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-1998 with Control 
Variables 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  
1996-1998 with Control Variables 
Run All Variables 
Dependent Variable Avg. GDP Growth 1996-1998 








Independent Variables B (Standard Error) Beta 
Democracy .211 (.432) .105 
WB Rule of Law 1.200 (1.167) .261 
WB Reg. Quality .546 (.807) .129 
WB Gov’t Effect 2.795 (1.500) .478* 
Resource Rich -1.141 (1.451) -.164 
PTrap Conflict -.636 (1.168) -.089 
PTrap Resource .519 (1.240) .081 
PTrap Land Locked 2.641 (1.339) .381* 
PTrap Bad Gov -1.092 (1.247) -.166 
PTrap Sum removed removed 
Economic Lib -.745 (.644) -.264 
Oil Import or Export 7.612 (2.534) .798*** 
GNI per capita PPP, 1995 -.001 (.000) -.539 
Constant 4.672 (2.291)  
*significant at the .10 level **significant at the .05 level  *** significant at the .01 level   
 
The relationship between democracy and economic growth found in this regression 
run was not commensurate with the strength of the relationship found in the bivariate 
correlation. I will now look at the different groups of control variables one at a time to 















For example, I will first run a regression with economic growth as the dependent 
variable with democracy and the poverty trap variables as the independent variables; 
in the next run I will add oil importing/exporting status.  Introducing the control 
variables one by one will allow me to see which variable, if any, causes democracy to 
lose its explanatory power and significance.  This method may also provide some 
clarity to the analysis in case the inclusion of many different variables causes some 
“static” in the analysis. This systematic regression is presented in two parts below.  
The first part shows runs with variable groups one through three and the second part 
shows runs with variable groups four though six. For a brief explanation of the 




Before I discuss the regression results below, I want to highlight the fact that 
democracy does maintain a statistically significant (at various levels) relationship 
with growth and each of the groups of control variables (World Bank good 
governance excluded) independently.  In other words, taking the control variables and 
running a regression with each of them (one by one or group by group) democracy 
still provides stronger explanatory value than any one of the control variables. The 
exception is the World Bank good governance indicators, and in this case, none of the 
variables provides a statistically significant level of explanatory power. I will not 
present these results here because I am more interested in the group effect, but this 
does highlight the explanatory power of democracy at a basic level. 
The multiple regression results below show that democracy maintains a statistically 
significant (at the .10 or .05 level) level of explanatory power through the first four 
control groups (poverty traps, oil import/export, resource rich, and GNI PPP per 
capita).  In the fifth run, the economic liberalization variable usurps democracy at the 
.05 level of significance rendering democracy to a status outside a level of 
significance.  The last run, with the addition of the World Bank good governance 
indicators, also displaces democracy and economic liberalization to levels that are not 
significant.  Interestingly, in that run, the poverty trap – land locked, oil 
importing/exporting and the government effectiveness variable all provide the highest 
level of explanatory power, with the oil importing/exporting variable having the 















status of a country in SSA provides the most explanatory power for the level of 
economic growth attained.  
Although it would have more convenient for my hypothesis had democracy remained 
significant throughout all of the regressions, these analyses prove that democracy is 
important at some level and in some scenarios.  I also want to note that the order in 
which I added the control variables likely affected the results as well.  This may be an 
area of further study where a step-wise regression could be used.  While the results do 
indicate that democracy is important to economic growth, they also indicate that there 
might be a sequential or multi-stage effect with the variables under consideration. 
Table 4.5: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-1998 with Control 
Variables Part I 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  
1996-1998 with Control Variables Group by Group  
Part I 
Dependent Variable Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Number of Control 
Variable Groups 
1 2 3 
Outliers Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 





















































PTrap Sum -.558 
(1.029) 
-.187 removed removed removed removed 





Resource Rich     -.701 
(1.482) 
-.092 
GNI per capita PPP, 
1995 
      
















WB Rule of Law       
WB Reg. Quality       













Table 4.6: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-1998 with Control 
Variables Part II 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  
1996-1998 with Control Variables Group by Group 
Part II 
Dependent Variable Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-1998 
Number of Control 
Variable Groups 
4 5 6 
Outliers Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Sierra Leone 





















































PTrap Sum removed removed removed removed removed removed 














































WB Reg. Quality     .546 
(.807) 
.129 










*significant at the .10 level **significant at the .05 level  *** significant at the .01 level   
 
Average GDP Growth 1996-2001 
For the 1996 to 2001 period, the correlation that I found between democracy and 
economic growth through the bivariate correlation analysis was .380 at the .05 level 
of significance.  This was slightly less significant than the 1996-1998 period but still a 
positive result. Similar to the 1996 to 1998 period I first performed a linear regression 
with all six of the control variables (good governance indicators, poverty traps, 
resource wealth, economic liberalization, oil importing/exporting, and GNI PPP). The 
results of this regression showed that only economic liberalization and oil 
importing/exporting status were statistically significant (at the lowest level of .10) 
explanatory variables for economic growth – democracy was not.  While this result 
lends to the argument of some of the critics I will now run a series of regressions 
group by group to see if democracy has any significance at all. 
Table 4.7: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-2001 with Control 
Variables 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  
1996-2001 with Control Variables 
Run All Variables 
Dependent Variable Avg. GDP Growth 1996-2001 







 B (Standard Error) Beta 
Democracy .105 (.360) .068 
WB Rule of Law 1.419 (.977) .381 
WB Reg. Quality -.008 (.759) -.002 
WB Gov’t Effect -.113 (1.297) -.023 
Resource Rich -1.679 (1.158) -.318 
PTrap Conflict -.284 (.964) -.051 
PTrap Resource .691 (1.049) .138 
PTrap Land Locked 1.313(1.123) .238 
PTrap Bad Gov -.907 (1.054) -.177 















Economic Lib -.994 (.541) -.444* 
Oil Import or Export 3.726 (2.148) .503* 
GNI per capita PPP, 1995 .000(.000) -.275 
Constant 3.608 (2.037)  
*significant at the .10 level **significant at the .05 level  *** significant at the .01 level   
 
This systematic regression is presented in two parts below.  The first part shows runs 
with variables one through three and the second part shows runs with variables four 
though six. Similar to the earlier period, democracy does maintain a statistically 
significant (at various levels) relationship with growth and each of the groups of 
control variables (World Bank good governance excluded) independently.  In other 
words, taking the control variables and running a regression with each of them (one 
by one) democracy still provides stronger explanatory value than any one of the 
control variables alone. The exception is World Bank good governance, and in this 
case, only the Rule of Law indicator provides a statistically significant level of 
explanatory power. Future study could involve the creation of a series of interaction 
effect variables to see if democracy and Rule of Law together provide more 
explanatory power than each alone. 
The multiple regression results below show that democracy maintains a statistically 
significant (at the .10 level) level of explanatory power only through the addition of 
the first control group (poverty traps).  After that, no control variable becomes 
significant until the fifth run when resource-rich and economic liberalization both 
provide explanatory power at a significant level. The last run, with the addition of the 
World Bank good governance variables, causes economic liberalization and oil 
importing/exporting status to provide a statistically significant level of explanatory 
power. These results may also have been affected by the order in which I added the 
variables and this may be an area of further study where a step-wise regression could 
be used.  The results do indicate that democracy is important to economic growth in 
some circumstances, but they also indicate that there might be a sequential or multi-

























Table 4.8: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-2001 with Control 
Variables Part I 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  




Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-2001 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-2001 





1 2 3 
Outliers Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
























































PTrap Sum -.240 
(.789) 
-.105 removed removed removed removed 





Resource Rich     -1.095 
(1.065) 
-.200 
GNI per capita 
PPP, 1995 
      
















WB Rule of Law       
WB Reg. Quality       













Table 4.9: Multiple Regression: Democracy (at 1995) and Growth 1996-2001 with Control 
Variables Part II 
Multiple Regression: 
Democracy (at 1995) and Average Economic Growth  




Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-2001 
Avg. GDP Growth 
1996-2001 





4 5 6 
Outliers Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Sudan, and 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
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WB Rule of Law     1.419 
(.977) 
.381 
WB Reg. Quality     -.008 
(.759) 
-.002 




























CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
Was a period of positive economic growth that followed a period of increased 
democratization a coincidence or was it a causal relationship?  Did countries with 
higher or increased levels of democracy have subsequent higher economic growth? 
This dissertation set out to improve the understanding of these questions surrounding 
the relationship between democracy and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa from 
1988 to 2007. 
Through both qualitative and quantitative methods, I have examined these questions 
and established several conclusions based upon my research question and hypothesis.  
Based on bivariate correlation analyses, the level of democracy does have a 
statistically significant and positive relationship with economic growth in SSA, over 
two periods in particular (1996-1998 and 1996-2001). This indicates that democracy 
is related to economic growth in the short-term based on the level of democracy at 
1995, but this relationship did not extend over the longer (9 and 12-year) periods. The 
bivariate correlation between the change in democracy (based on the first free and fair 
or first competitive national election) and economic growth did not show any 
statistically significant relationship. This is interesting because the descriptive 
statistics showed that economic growth decreased for the three-year period prior to an 
election and then increased most of the periods subsequent to an election. It could be 
that the democracy measure from Freedom House lagged the election such that a 
likely increase in the level of democracy did not match the periods of measurement.  
Results from the multiple linear regression analyses, which test the relationship 
between democracy and economic growth along with control variables, have shown 
mixed results. Democracy had the strongest, positive and significant  relationship with 
growth in the shorter periods of three years and six years versus the longer periods of 
nine years and 12 years. Although I did not expect an immediate (within a year or 
less) increase in economic growth following a democratization, I did expect the 
relationship between democracy and growth to be stronger over the long-term. The 
regressions also showed that democracy maintains a statistically significant and 
positive relationship with growth when some combinations of control variables are 















maintains a statistically significant level of explanatory power for economic growth 
with the addition of four different groups of control variables.  The addition of the 
economic liberalization and then the World Bank good governance variables caused 
this relationship to dissipate, but it does show that democracy is relevant and part of 
the process leading to higher levels of economic growth.   
At various points in the regressions the control variables World Bank Government 
Effectiveness, economic liberalization, resource-rich and oil importing/exporting 
status all had statistically significant relationships with growth, but no one control 
variable dominated throughout the analysis. The oil importing/exporting variable had 
a significant and positive relationship with growth and although the relationship was 
significant and negative with economic liberalization, it is actually positive because 
the scale of economic growth and economic liberalization are inverted. These results 
lend to the argument of some scholars that believe oil/resource wealth is the most 
important factor leading to increased economic growth. Likewise, the positive 
relationship between countries that effectively implemented economic reform policies 
satisfies critics that believe that economic growth is most dependent on countries with 
open markets and liberal economic policies.  
The statistical results can also be used to refute the resource-rich argument that many 
critics cite; increased economic growth in SSA cannot simply be explained by the 
countries that export large quantities of energy, minerals and forests.  Likewise, initial 
wealth (GNI PPP) and the poverty traps failed to provide a substantial explanation for 
economic growth in SSA. 
The multiple regression also revealed that there might be a sequence effect for 
increased growth. Testing this would require a more detailed, multi-stage statistical 
analysis. There are many factors that play into economic growth (timing being one of 
them) but it has also been shown in this study that democracy does not negatively 
affect economic growth. The study did not support a causal relationship between 
democracy and economic growth. However, taking all of the results into account and 
the fact that democracy alone is not necessary for economic growth, nor is it a 
















What does this all mean and what can we take away from this study? Democracy does 
have a positive relationship with economic growth some of the time and some popular 
explanations of the relationship between democracy and economic growth have been 
falsified. The increase in the number of democratic states in sub-Saharan Africa can 
only benefit the region. For bilateral donors, stable, transparent regimes that respect 
the rights of its citizens are of paramount importance and the emergence of more 
democratic states validates the recent work promoting democracy, governance and 
economic development.  SAA’s authoritarian regimes with economies based on 
resources are not likely to be dislodged anytime soon as there is too much money and 
power to be had, but supporting and promoting democratic change in the region can 







































































































Poverty Trap - 
Landlocked 
(1=Y, 0=N)











Angola 1992 1992 1.00 1.00 1280.00 0.38 -4.25 -1.34 -0.37 1.42 4.76 1.56 1.57 3.31 7.01 -1.51 -1.42 -1.32 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Benin 1991 1991 4.50 5.00 910.00 0.01 -2.87 0.48 0.70 0.93 0.75 1.68 1.67 1.29 1.10 -0.30 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Botswana n/a n/a n/a 5.00 5960.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.69 3.09 2.68 3.42 0.63 0.74 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burkina Faso 2002 1991 1.00 2.50 610.00 -0.99 -1.01 1.00 1.57 1.95 2.21 4.15 3.66 3.19 3.10 -0.31 -0.08 -0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Burundi 1991 1991 0.00 0.50 320.00 1.16 -2.11 -4.45 -3.52 -2.96 -2.54 -1.63 -1.91 -1.73 -1.78 -0.89 -1.55 -0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
Cameroon n/a 1992 0.50 1.00 1250.00 -6.68 -3.03 -0.47 -0.03 0.42 0.41 2.09 1.47 1.57 1.27 -1.42 -0.79 -1.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3.00
Cape Verde 1991 1991 3.00 5.50 1570.00 0.47 2.95 5.11 6.25 5.60 5.27 6.40 6.62 5.46 5.48 0.52 -0.75 -0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Central African Rep. 1993 1992 2.00 3.50 590.00 -4.57 -1.74 0.17 -0.14 -0.75 -0.33 -0.85 -0.11 -1.17 -0.55 -0.28 -0.27 -0.91 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 3.00
Chad n/a n/a n/a 1.50 740.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.89 -2.27 5.07 4.17 -0.89 -0.86 -0.65 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 3.00
Comoros 1996 1990 1.00 3.00 920.00 -0.41 -3.30 -1.78 -1.73 -1.15 -1.34 -2.38 -0.76 -0.91 -1.11 n/a -0.82 -0.71 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00
Congo, Dem. Rep. n/a n/a n/a 0.50 250.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -9.60 -7.34 -5.20 -3.08 -2.02 -2.56 -1.76 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 3.00
Congo, Rep. 1992 1992 3.50 3.00 1460.00 -3.45 0.37 0.75 -0.13 -0.32 -0.66 1.14 -0.39 -0.55 -0.91 -1.41 -0.90 -1.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 3.00
Cote d'Ivoire 1990 1990 0.50 1.50 1270.00 2.53 -4.59 -1.34 -0.24 -1.18 -1.46 3.41 0.56 -0.33 -0.85 -0.70 -0.04 0.01 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
Djibouti 1997 1993 -0.50 1.50 1780.00 -8.31 -1.46 5.41 3.41 2.31 1.24 -2.69 5.46 2.76 1.37 -0.25 0.17 -0.97 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00
Equatorial Guinea n/a 1993 0.50 0.00 1760.00 0.71 21.15 36.66 35.25 29.71 25.40 70.09 49.73 40.14 30.56 -1.23 -1.04 -1.47 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Eritrea n/a n/a n/a 2.00 620.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.23 -0.76 -1.86 -1.34 -0.28 0.00 -0.39 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.00
Ethiopia n/a 1995 0.50 2.50 390.00 -1.74 2.51 2.44 1.51 3.03 3.03 2.51 2.44 1.51 3.03 -0.93 -1.82 -0.94 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 0.00
Gabon 1993 1990 -0.50 2.50 10510.00 -0.19 -0.30 -0.46 -2.07 1.83 -1.69 -1.68 -3.51 -2.46 -2.06 -1.01 0.04 -0.78 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
Gambia 1992 1982 0.50 0.50 840.00 1.49 -2.55 -1.33 -0.38 0.29 0.61 -0.11 0.70 1.24 1.40 0.41 -1.77 -0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ghana 1996 1992 0.50 3.00 770.00 1.02 0.15 -0.97 0.82 1.50 1.86 -2.09 1.16 1.95 2.29 -0.43 0.11 -0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Guinea 1995 1993 0.00 1.50 720.00 1.71 3.83 3.23 2.80 1.93 1.93 3.83 3.23 2.80 1.93 -1.39 0.19 -1.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
Guinea-Bissau 1994 1994 2.00 3.50 550.00 10.90 6.18 -1.31 -1.58 -1.46 -1.00 -5.27 -2.88 -2.34 -1.52 -1.69 0.13 -0.68 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 2.00
Kenya 2002 1992 1.50 0.50 1040.00 0.54 -0.05 -0.17 -0.15 0.18 0.30 -0.29 -0.20 0.25 0.39 -1.01 -0.36 -0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Lesotho 1993 1993 2.00 3.00 1240.00 -2.40 4.07 3.95 3.13 3.55 3.93 6.10 3.57 3.51 4.07 -0.30 -0.62 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.00
Liberia n/a n/a n/a 0.50 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 37.28 24.45 13.26 10.67 -2.28 -3.13 -1.78 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 0.00
Madagascar 1993 1993 1.00 4.00 680.00 -3.79 -1.34 -0.60 -1.86 -1.12 -1.01 -1.29 -0.05 -1.80 -1.00 -0.96 -0.52 -0.99 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Malawi 1994 1994 4.00 4.50 530.00 -0.01 7.56 2.88 2.27 3.21 2.90 3.45 0.15 1.94 2.31 -0.64 -0.21 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Mali 1992 1992 3.50 4.50 610.00 1.82 -0.36 2.68 2.24 2.64 2.15 5.72 3.54 3.64 2.78 -0.59 -0.01 -0.81 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 1.00
Mauritania 2001 1992 0.00 1.00 1280.00 0.36 0.47 -0.50 -0.06 -0.30 0.86 -1.48 -0.33 -0.56 0.96 -0.89 -0.86 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Mauritius n/a n/a n/a 5.50 5630.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.98 4.27 3.62 3.84 0.72 0.12 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Mozambique 1994 1994 1.00 3.50 300.00 -0.76 0.22 0.84 4.50 5.00 5.06 6.96 6.27 7.06 6.67 -1.02 -1.00 -0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00
Namibia 1989 1989 2.00 4.50 3680.00 3.43 0.75 0.12 0.15 0.30 1.13 0.20 0.47 1.77 1.64 0.35 0.06 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Niger 1993 1993 2.00 3.00 470.00 -2.22 -0.03 0.71 -0.03 0.23 0.27 1.60 -0.02 0.36 0.38 -0.88 -1.19 -1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Nigeria n/a 1993 -1.00 0.00 1080.00 -0.31 -0.93 -0.29 3.23 3.27 5.40 2.21 2.29 5.12 6.63 -1.42 -1.13 -1.35 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Rwanda n/a n/a n/a 0.50 480.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -1.20 1.27 1.28 1.41 -1.49 -1.79 -1.23 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 3.00
Sao Tome & Principe 1991 1991 4.00 5.50 n/a -5.29 -1.52 -1.89 -0.83 0.68 0.17 5.01 3.44 3.98 2.06 n/a -0.27 -0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
Senegal 1993 1978 -1.00 2.50 n/a -2.06 0.63 0.75 0.65 0.98 0.96 0.68 0.80 1.08 1.03 -0.45 -0.36 -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
Seychelles 1993 1993 2.50 4.00 11380.00 5.38 0.73 3.77 2.32 0.95 1.74 9.17 5.63 1.55 2.42 n/a -1.36 -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sierra Leone n/a n/a n/a 0.50 400.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -16.22 -3.95 -1.97 -0.28 -1.31 -0.92 -0.72 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
South Africa 1994 1994 2.00 5.50 5870.00 -1.59 1.68 1.81 1.81 2.32 2.54 1.24 2.00 2.02 2.64 0.16 0.04 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sudan n/a n/a n/a 0.00 840.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8.29 6.56 6.38 6.60 -1.64 -1.88 -1.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 3.00
Swaziland n/a 1993 0.00 1.50 3050.00 0.30 3.26 2.25 1.88 1.80 1.75 0.20 0.62 1.24 1.35 0.79 0.14 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tanzania 2000 1995 0.50 2.00 640.00 -0.48 2.51 2.44 1.51 3.03 3.03 1.11 1.84 2.92 3.21 -0.38 -0.06 -0.98 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
Togo n/a 1993 0.00 1.50 600.00 -1.67 4.10 1.03 -1.01 -0.36 -0.47 -1.02 -2.13 -1.62 -1.32 -1.35 0.58 -0.73 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Uganda n/a n/a n/a 2.50 540.00 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.10 3.54 2.81 2.19 -0.70 0.28 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Zambia 1991 1991 3.00 3.50 760.00 -3.09 -4.30 -3.35 -2.24 -0.96 3.55 -0.76 -1.02 7.10 6.32 -0.60 0.34 -0.70 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 2.00
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i
 While Lipset’s endogenous explanation (an economic term meaning that democracy 
will only develop and be sustained once a certain level of economic development is 
attained) of democracy has been called into question over the years, it was at one 
point an integral part of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s, casting doubt on whether 
democracy was necessary at all given the economic growth of the communist 
countries; perhaps order and discipline were the only necessary ingredients for 
growth? 
ii
 World Bank website, available at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html. 
iii
 United Nations website, available at: 
 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. 
iv
 Freedom House website, available at:  www.freedomhouse.org. 
v United Nations Development Programme website available at:   
http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/policy/chapter2.htm. 
vi
 Data were unavailable for Angola, Djibouti, Liberia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Sudan, 
and Swaziland from 1960-1970, Eritrea from 1960-1992, and Sierra Leone for 1960 
and 1961. 
vii
 According to the World Bank Web Site, “purchasing power parity (PPP) 
conversion factors take into account differences in the relative prices of goods and 
services—particularly non-tradables—and therefore provide a better overall measure 
of the real value of output produced by an economy compared to other economies. 
PPP GNI is measured in current international dollars which, in principal, have the 
same purchasing power as a dollar spent on GNI in the U.S. economy. Because PPPs 
provide a better measure of the standard of living of residents of an economy, they are 
the basis for the World Bank’s calculations of poverty rates at $1 and $2 a day. The 
GNI of developing countries measured in PPP terms generally exceeds their GNI 
















                                                                                                                                                              
viii
 R-squared measures the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (growth) 
that can be explained by the independent variables (democracy and control 
variables).  This is an overall measure of the strength of association and does not 
reflect the extent to which any particular independent variable is associated with the 
dependent variable.  
Adjusted R-squared is a measurement that penalizes the addition of extraneous 
predictors to the model.   
B is the unstandardized value (based on the  for the regression equation for predicting 
the dependent variable from the independent variable. 
Beta - These are the standardized coefficients that you would obtain if you 
standardized all of the variables in the regression, including the dependent and all of 
the independent variables, and ran the regression.  By standardizing the variables 
before running the regression, you have put all of the variables on the same scale, and 
you can compare the magnitude of the coefficients to see which one has more of an 
effect.  You will also notice that the larger betas are associated with the larger t-values 
and lower p-values. 
Source: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/output/reg_spss.htm [accessed on January 
23, 2011] 
